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[501] 
Antitrust, Regulation, and the “New” Rules of 
Sports Telecasts 
Babette Boliek 
Open almost any news source, or simply turn on the program guide of any television, and 
the explosive proliferation of sports telecasts is quickly evident. The amount that 
exhibitors pay to sports leagues has reached dizzying heights, due in large part to high 
demand and the unique, unrecorded nature of sports telecasts. These desirable 
characteristics arguably make sports telecast contracts essential to the economic viability 
and competitiveness of leagues and telecasters alike. Although these contracts provide 
many benefits to corporations and leagues, embedded within them are weighty 
restrictions such as “black out” rules and exclusive distributorships. These restrictions 
raise questions as to the ultimate effect that such contracts have on competition and 
overall consumer welfare. The two legal mechanisms that traditionally protect industry-
wide competition and consumer welfare are antitrust law and regulation. This is no less 
true in the professional sports and telecast industries. The collision of these two industries 
has resulted in a labyrinth of regulation and uneven antitrust enforcement that diminishes 
consumer choice, program diversity, and competition. 
 
This Article presents a novel quantitative analysis of sports league antitrust jurisprudence 
to counter cries for increased regulatory scrutiny of these joint ventures. The results 
demonstrate that antitrust is not only capable of policing joint ventures, but that the 
Supreme Court revitalized such review in American Needle v. NFL. Based on empirical 
review of past case law, current antitrust exemptions, and relevant regulatory policy, this 
Article presents several recommendations to both (1) rationalize regulatory rules that 
currently create disparate treatment among leagues and telecasters, and (2) clear the field 
for pro-consumer competition in sports telecasts. 
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The refrain is simple, indeed distressing to some: “Why can’t I watch 
my home team live on television?”1 The lament is understandable: as 
society becomes increasingly mobile, and we live far from our childhood 
home teams and college alma maters, our desire to stay connected to our 
prior communities increases—sometimes via nostalgic fandom. But if you 
 
 1. Regardless of the video platform used—Internet, cable, satellite or broadcast—program 
access to certain games might be restricted based on the viewer’s zip code. 
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live in Los Angeles and root for the New York Rangers, viewing access to 
your team’s games is limited. The reasons behind these limitations 
implicate a thicket of statutes, regulations, judicial decisions, and private 
contracts. However, the fan’s simple lament is arguably at the heart of a 
much larger concern of national importance: How and when should we 
govern the industry that creates and controls video content?2 Are certain 
programs or networks of such social import that they should receive 
heightened legal scrutiny? For example, should the Super Bowl be 
“nationalized?”3 
This Article analyzes sports telecast law and Congress’ long-held view 
that such telecasts4 are the economic juggernaut that should be harnessed 
to support the regulators’ favored market structure for both the 
professional sports and communications industries.5 However, these 
regulatory preferences—namely for over-the-air broadcasters—are 
showing their age in today’s era of rapid technological development.6 
 
 2. For example, Columbia Professor Tim Wu argues that “[i]nformation industries . . . can never 
be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries,” and traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust 
enforcement, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.” Tim Wu, The 
Master Switch 301–03 (2010). The basis of Wu’s belief is that because of the speech element inherent 
in information industries, they are “fundamental to democracy,” and therefore should be subject to 
heightened regulatory treatment. Id. at 302.  
 3. See discussion infra notes 273–279 and accompanying text. 
 4. The term “telecast” is used as an umbrella for all video distribution platforms, including cable, 
satellite, and broadcast. “Broadcast” is reserved to refer to “free, over-the-air” transmissions, for 
example ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox Broadcast Network, and PBS. 
 5. As regulators have recently noted, sports programming is of particular importance to the 
economic vitality of distributors. See Revision of the Commission’s Program Access Rules, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 66026–65 (Oct. 31, 2012) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76) [hereinafter Revision of Program 
Access Rules]. Cable access programming rules were allowed to sunset except for Regional Sports 
Networks (“RSNs”), which must by law be made available to competitors at reasonable rates. Id. See 
Hal Singer, Program Access Reform at the FCC: Are Exclusive Programming Deals a Good Thing?, 
Forbes.com (Oct. 7, 2012, 11:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halsinger/2012/10/07/program-
access-reform-at-the-fcc-are-exclusive-programming-deals-a-good-thing (“[T]he FCC established a 
‘rebuttable presumption’ that an exclusive contract involving a cable-affiliated RSN violates the Cable 
Act[,] [b]ecause sports programming is one of the few types of ‘must have’ programming.”). This is 
consistent with past reports on video competition noting that sports programming is a key component 
to the program schedule for two unique reasons: (1) it generates high ratings in desirable age 
demographics and (2) its greatest value is in the live telecast. See Annual Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610 ¶ 372 (2012) 
[hereinafter Delivery of Video Programming]. 
 6. See FCC, Broadband Performance: OBI Technical Paper Number Four 7 (showing that 
per person usage of broadband internet is growing at a substantial clip of thirty percent to thirty-five 
percent per annum); A World of Choice, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20130120051622/http://www.ncta.com/statistic/statistic/Consumer-Choice-Explodes.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2013) (showing a correlation between the explosion of various video sources (e.g., 
iTunes, Hulu, Netflix, U-verse, Dish, DirecTV) and a drop in the percentage of customers served by 
cable from ninety-eight percent in 1992 to just fifty-seven percent in 2012). 
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Technology is currently capable of transmitting a greater variety of 
content than ever before, which increases consumer choices.7 Nevertheless, 
it is arguably not the technology, but the legal framework for the 
communications industry that will either increase or retard the growth of 
consumer welfare.8 The sports telecast industry is governed by two titans 
of legal authority: antitrust law and communications regulation.9 Many 
commentators speak only of antitrust when analyzing sports telecast joint 
ventures.10 It is tempting to do so because the issues are fascinating, but to 
speak only of antitrust when an industry-specific regulator is implicated is 
to tell only half the story. 
Although the two often share the same goal—enhancement of 
competition—regulators have struggled to balance additional considerations 
that may be incompatible to competitive growth.11 For example, the 
regulator may strive to encourage “localism,”12 to preserve “free over-
 
 7. For example, the University of Texas and ESPN reached a twenty-year agreement to operate 
the “Longhorn Network” that will broadcast over two-hundred exclusive events. UT Athletics and 
IMG College/Longhorn Sports Marketing Products, TexasSports.com, http://www.texassports.com/ 
sports/2013/7/25/GEN_0725130745.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). In addition, there is a full access 
Longhorn Network website. Longhorn Network, ESPN.com, http://espn.go.com/longhornnetwork (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2013) (creating a dedicated site on ESPN.com for the University of Texas’s sports 
network). 
 8. As regulators have recently noted, sports programming is of particular importance to the 
economic vitality of distributors. See Singer, supra note 5. 
 9. For purposes of this Article, the terms “antitrust law(s)” or “competition law” have the 
meaning given them in section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2006), all sections of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006), and the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a–13b, 21a 
(2006). In addition, the term includes the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45 (2006), to the extent that section 5 of the FTC Act applies to unfair methods of competition. The 
definition is modeled on that used in other antitrust acts, such as the National Cooperative Research 
Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–06 (2006). 
 10. See generally Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly 
Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397 (2009); Andrew C. Hruska, A Broad Market Approach to 
Antitrust Product Market Definition in Innovative Industries, 102 Yale L.J. 305 (1992); Mark A. 
Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and 
IP, 100 Geo. L.J. 2055 (2012); Harry Ballan, Note, The Courts’ Assault on the Robinson-Patman Act, 
92 Colum. L. Rev. 634 (1992); Note, Antitrust and the Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization 
Analyses in the New Economy, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1623 (2001). 
 11. See Stanley M. Gorinson, Overview: Essential Facilities and Regulation, 58 Antitrust L.J. 871, 
872, 875–77 (1989); Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the 
Monopoly Man, 82 Yale L.J. 871, 876–83 (1973); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory 
Enterprise, 2004 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 335, 357–59 (2004); Robert B. von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws 
and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 942–47 (1954); 
Note, Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws: Substantive and Procedural Coordination, 
58 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 673–79 (1958); cf. Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product 
Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1471, 1472–73 (2008). 
 12. The preference for local, free, over-the-air broadcast, for example was reiterated in a recent 
FCC report, which noted “that the concept of localism has been a cornerstone of broadcast regulation 
for decades.” Broadcast Localism, 23 FCC Rcd. 667, 1324 ¶ 5 (2008). The concept was “derive[d] from 
Title III of the Communications Act . . . and is reflected in and supported by a number of current 
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the-air” broadcast, or to indulge in a technology preference for satellite 
over cable.13 These particular regulatory objectives are intimately 
intertwined with sports telecasts.14 
The regulatory treatment of sports telecasts is in a state of flux, 
which raises great concern about the status of antitrust related to sports 
telecasts. Interestingly, antitrust is in a state of relative maturity as 
evidenced by the original dataset and novel empirical analysis presented 
in this Article.15 The market for sports telecast contracts is fascinatingly 
(or maddeningly) complex because it involves multi-layered, joint 
activity. Generally expressed, sports telecasts involve two joint ventures. 
First, there is the cooperation among the league itself, which may be 
anticompetitive. For example, under what circumstances may independent 
teams pool their rights to sell them to a national broadcaster? The second 
layer of joint activity is the contract between the sports league and the 
telecaster, which may also violate antitrust law. Antitrust has most 
frequently been criticized for lacking consistent criteria and analysis in the 
realm of joint ventures. 
Notwithstanding these scholarly critiques, there has been no attempt 
to quantify past cases to identify strong trends in antitrust jurisprudence. 
This oversight threatens to both overstate past inconsistencies and 
 
Commission policies and rules. . . . [O]ur broadcast regulatory framework is designed to foster a 
system of local stations that respond to the unique concerns and interests.” Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
 13. For an in-depth discussion of the disparate treatment of satellite over cable, see infra 
Part III.A–B. One example for such preferences is written within the Satellite Home Viewer Act, see 
infra note 68, which guarantees satellite operators a low cost license (per subscriber, per signal, per 
month royalty fee) to retransmit certain “distant” (non-local) broadcast television signals to their 
subscribers. See 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2006). To obtain a similar license, cable operators by contrast must 
pay a higher fee based on a gross receipts royalty formula. See id. § 111(d). Another example is the 
protection of local broadcast from cable over concerns that cable would “siphon” revenues away from 
local broadcasters. Phillip M. Cox II, Note, Flag on the Play? The Siphoning Effect on Sports 
Television, 47 Fed. Comm. L.J. 571, 572 (1995). The passage of the sports black out rules is just part of 
Congress’ attempt to support the broadcaster over cable. Id. at 580–81. 
 14. For example, regulators consistently use sports telecasts as the economic engine for industrial 
engineering—either encouraging or discouraging it depending on the policy goal. Recently, for 
example, the cable programming access rules were allowed to sunset except for RSNs. These rules 
were established to encourage development of direct broadcast services (“DBS”) over cable by 
ensuring DBS has access to all cable-owned shows. See discussion supra note 5. 
 15. Antitrust law and the agencies that enforce it have been the guardians of competition in the 
United States since the passage of the Sherman Act, Law of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004)). The Act, notable for its brevity, has been called by some the 
“Magna Carta of free enterprise”—emphasizing the common law nature of defining the statute’s 
actual application. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); see also Cal. 
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980) (“Antitrust laws . . . are 
as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of 
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.” (quoting Topco, 405 U.S. at 610)); 
City of Lafayette, La. v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 n.16 (1978) (same); GTE Sylvania 
Inc. v. Cont’l T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1015 (9th Cir. 1976) (same). 
K - Boliek_15 (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:35 PM 
506 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:501 
 
undervalue the rationality of past joint venture analyses. Here too, the 
analysis of sports league antitrust jurisprudence proves illustrative of the 
broader universe of joint venture review.16 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 
most recent word on joint ventures involved the National Football League 
(“NFL”).17 
This Article presents a unique and novel data set that draws out 
several characteristics of sports league judicial history and concludes that 
American Needle is less a sea change in the law than an invigorating 
endorsement of past precedent. Although American Needle leaves much 
unresolved, an implicit and judicially viable two-part test for Sherman 
Act section 1 violations emerges when analyzed within the unique 
context of sports-league jurisprudence.18 The Court’s unique articulation 
of the American Needle holding and dicta is shown not only as consistent 
with past precedent,19 but as a desirable interpretation that creates a 
disciplined and more certain judicial review of joint venture activity. 
Antitrust, for all its virtue, cannot apply where it has no jurisdiction. 
Because antitrust jurisdiction is limited or forbidden where an industry-
specific regulator has spoken, the importance of regulatory judgment and 
restraint is heightened.20 In the arena of telecommunications, the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) has been entrusted with the 
broad statutory mandate to regulate the industry for the “public interest, 
convenience, and necessity.”21 Because the FCC is not bound solely by 
the competitive concerns that drive antitrust authorities, regulation 
provides special interest lobbyists a means to gain protection or to 
 
 16. In particular, although not greatly focused upon, sports broadcast has been mentioned by 
notable scholars as providing a dividing line—a potential safe zone where league restraints will be 
treated as unilateral action. See, e.g., Herbert J. Hovenkamp, American Needle and the Boundaries of 
the Firm in Antitrust Law (Aug. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1616625. 
 17. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 18. Id. The Supreme Court noted, “[o]ther features of the NFL may also save agreements 
amongst the teams. We have recognized, for example, ‘that the interest in maintaining a competitive 
balance’ among ‘athletic teams is legitimate and important.’” Id. at 2217 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984)). Although the Court found that maintaining 
competitive balance would not justify treating the NFL as a single entity “when it comes to the 
marketing of the teams’ individually owned intellectual property,” it took pains to note that support of 
competitive balance among teams is “unquestionably an interest that may well justify a variety of 
collective decisions made by the teams.” Id. The Court left open to lower courts exactly what would be 
the proper role for this justification in a rule of reason analysis of the exclusive deal at issue. Id. 
 19. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6 (2006); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 
392 (1927). 
 20. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 271–75 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. 
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 406, 412 (2004). See generally Babette E.L. 
Boliek, FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust: How Net Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1627 (2011). 
 21. Communications Act of 1934 §§ 1–719, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–621 (2006). 
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advance their preferred form of industrial engineering, relatively free 
from antitrust scrutiny.22 Indeed, antitrust in the arena of sports leagues 
has been directly and expressly limited at least twice: the infamous non-
statutory “baseball exemption” and the statutory exemption of certain 
sports broadcast contracts.23 
Regulators must protect consumers with heightened vigilance in 
areas that lack antitrust oversight.24 In other words the current strength 
of antitrust law is properly part of the “public interest” calculus of the 
regulator. The converse is also true: as antitrust rises, the regulator 
should reassess regulations or risk overregulation and an associated 
decrease in consumer welfare.25 
Although American Needle may not create a sea change in the law, 
it does represent a resurgence in antitrust focus with direct implications 
for the regulation of the sports telecast industry. But many regulatory 
policies and rules—especially those that support preferred content and 
technologies—have not been revised in decades.26 Once outdated 
regulations are removed, sports telecasts contracts, like all other joint 
ventures, must face review by antitrust authorities. Reducing regulations 
will not guarantee that all fans can see any sports telecast in any given city, 
but it will at a minimum rationalize regulatory and antitrust treatment 
among sports leagues and other content providers. This Article addresses 
exactly these issues: the relative strength of antitrust in the arena of 
 
 22. See D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions that Benefit Special 
Interests, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 119, 129–30 (2009); Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition Always 
Good?, 1 J. Antitrust Enforcement 162, 167 (2013). 
 23. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (affirming Major League Baseball’s antitrust 
exemption, finding that “Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the 
scope of federal antitrust laws”) (quoting Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953)); Sports 
Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 24. See infra Part II.C.1. The comprehensive empirical analysis provides evidence to explain that 
if, for example, American Needle is read to abolish the single entity defense, that does not signify a 
great change in the law. The reality is that such a defense has never been relied on heavily by either 
the courts or the leagues themselves. See infra Figure 2. Therefore, antitrust has arguably always been 
available to remedy competitive issues in sports league markets, and the role of the regulator can be 
minimized given current market conditions. 
 25. See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Since ‘the basic goal of direct 
governmental regulation through administrative bodies and the goal of indirect governmental 
regulation in the form of antitrust law is the same—to achieve the most efficient allocation of 
resources possible,’ we have insisted that the agencies consider antitrust policy as an important part of 
their public interest calculus.”) (citation omitted) (quoting N. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 
399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). 
 26. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103–10 (1973) 
(recounting the legislative history of the Communications Act of 1934); see also Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996); Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992); A Legislative History of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989); The Communications Act: A Legislative 
History of the Major Amendments 1934–1996 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1999). 
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sports telecast; the areas in which regulatory policy might assist or deter 
pro-consumer development; and recommendations for the rationalization 
of policy and enforcement regimes. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the current and historic trends of 
regulation and antitrust jurisprudence giving particular attention to 
concerns that arise in the context of sports telecasts.27 Part II examines 
sports telecasts as an illustrative example of the issues inherent with joint 
venture analysis.28 Part II also analyzes the Supreme Court’s most recent 
joint venture analysis in American Needle,29 which held that the NFL’s 
pooling of certain intellectual property was a violation of the Sherman 
Act.30 This Article both presents a novel proposal—that American Needle 
is best construed as a two-part test for Sherman Act violations—and sets 
out a unique and novel empirical analysis of sports league antitrust 
jurisprudence.31 This dataset provides a firm foundation from which 
disciplined analysis of future antitrust decisions is possible. 
Part III lays out three specific examples of the interaction and often 
competing interests of antitrust enforcement and regulatory policy,32 
paying attention to the FCC’s recent decision to sunset cable programming 
access rules, except for regional sports networks for which the rules will 
remain in place.33 Part IV makes specific recommendations are made to 
Congress and governmental agencies to level the playing field for sports 
leagues and telecaster joint ventures and to thereby create greater 
certainty in the marketplace and encourage pro-consumer developments.34 
In particular, this Article uses novel empirical and normative analysis of 
the Sports Broadcast Act (“SBA”) to argue that not much is lost and that 
much might be gained by abolishing the act in its entirety.35 In addition, 
timely recommendations are made with respect to the FCC’s sports 
broadcast rules and the cable programming access rules, both of which 
are currently up for review.36 Finally, this Article concludes with a long-
range view of the future of joint ventures under antitrust enforcement 
with sports leagues as an illustrative example.37 
 
 27. See infra notes 38–78 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 79–160 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 98–135 and accompanying text. 
 30. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010). 
 31. See infra notes 137–160 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 161–245 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra notes 206–245 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 246–272 and accompanying text. 
 35. As a means to prevent an NFL lock-out, a bill was introduced in the 112th Congress to abolish 
the Sports Broadcast Act (“SBA”) exemption from antitrust laws only as to the NFL. Prevent Lockout 
of Athletes this Year Act of 2011, H.R. 1060, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). Such opportunistic legislation is 
exactly the type that can be prevented (or at least diminished) by abolishing the act. 
 36. See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
 37. See infra notes 273–279 and accompanying text. 
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I.  The Current Relationship of Antitrust, Regulation, and 
Sports Broadcast 
As noted, antitrust and industry-specific regulation are two distinct 
means to achieve much the same social goal—to protect consumers and 
encourage efficiencies in production and distribution.38 However, the two 
regimes are by no means interchangeable, and the choice between them 
is itself imbued with certain social policy preferences.39 Antitrust law is 
an enforcement regime that preserves competition across all private 
industries by condemning anticompetitive conduct only after it occurs.40 
In contrast, industrial regulation is inherently a social admission that, in a 
given industry, market forces are too weak to produce the consumer 
benefits that are realized in competitive markets.41 Therefore, regulated 
industries are an exception to the economy at large and are subject to 
preemptive, regulatory rule that may actively engineer industry conduct 
far beyond that permitted under antitrust law.42 
As the discussion below demonstrates, the Communications Act itself 
exhibits legislative preferences for certain telecommunications platforms 
that threaten to lock the United States into a pre-digital status quo.43 A 
 
 38. See generally Boliek, supra note 20. 
 39. As then-Chief Judge Stephen Breyer stated, while regulation and the antitrust laws “typically 
aim at similar goals—i.e., low and economically efficient prices, innovation, and efficient production 
methods,” regulation looks to achieve these goals directly “through rules and regulations; [but] 
antitrust seeks to achieve them indirectly by promoting and preserving a process that tends to bring 
them about.” Town of Concord, Mass. v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st. Cir. 1990). 
 40. Antitrust will act preemptively in the case of merger review by prohibiting the merger of 
entities if believed such merger will “lessen competition” in the relevant market post-merger. 
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 41. See The Annenberg Washington Program, Does Regulation Have a Role in a Competitive 
Environment, Annenberg Publications Online (1992), http://www.annenberg.northwestern.edu/ 
pubs/telmar/telmar06.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
 42. This implicit tradeoff between regulation and antitrust has been long noted. As Alfred Kahn 
explained: “The essence of regulation is the explicit replacement of competition with government 
orders as the principle institutional device for assuring good performance.” Alfred E. Kahn, The 
Economics of Regulation 20 (1970). See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411–12 (2004). 
 43. At the inception of the telecast industry, video was broadcast with analog technology. The 
move to highly efficient digital technology has increased telecasters’ channel capacity exponentially. 
Even so, the Communications Act has not been amended to reflect these tremendous technological 
advances. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–620 (2006). The Act is broken into “silos” 
delineated upon distinctions in distribution platforms—for example, wire or radio communication, 
47 U.S.C. §§ 151–621; communications satellite system, 47 U.S.C. §§ 700–69; local TV, 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101–10; and broadband, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1301–05. The result is that absurd disparities in regulation 
exist simply due to technology differences by which identical data is transmitted. Although much 
complained of, little has been done to ensure regulatory parity—but in the arena of sports league 
telecast there is potential that regulatory change is not only possible, but desirable. See, e.g., Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1997) (affirming the importance of “three interrelated 
interests: (1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the 
widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair 
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natural “tug-of-war” arises when an industry involves an industry-specific 
regulator with a policy agenda in conflict with antitrust goals. To put these 
issues in perspective, a brief history of sports broadcast and the trade-offs 
made between regulation and antitrust enforcement in the sports telecast 
industry are discussed below. 
A. The First Sports Broadcast 
In the case of sports telecasts, there exists an intriguing tale of 
antitrust and regulatory tradeoffs. The first televised broadcast of an 
athletic competition was the less-than-riveting combat between the 
Princeton Tigers and Columbia Lions to determine rank three and four 
in the Ivy College baseball league.44 In 1939, the technology to capture 
high speed action of that game was far from perfect and it was highly 
uncertain that televised sport would capture fan excitement.45 Of course, 
the technology improved and now telecast sporting events are some of 
the most highly rated shows available.46 
The first antitrust challenge to a league’s broadcast restrictions came 
soon after the first broadcast.47 At issue in United States v. NFL (NFL I) 
was an early version of the NFL’s blackout rules.48 These rules prohibit 
NFL member teams from broadcasting their own games to networks in 
markets other than their own (as regulated by league agreement) on days 
 
competition in the market for television programming” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 662 (1994))); see also Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984) (holding 
that “protecting noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting service due to 
competition from cable systems” is a “substantial federal interest”). 
 44. Lou Schwartz, Sportscasting Firsts: 1920–Present, Am. Sportscasters Online, 
http://www.americansportscastersonline.com/sportscastingfirsts.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). As a 
Columbian, this Author must regrettably report that it was indeed a Tiger victory. 
 45. As NBC’s pioneering television sports director Harry Coyle put it, “[t]elevision got off the 
ground because of sports . . . . Today, maybe, sports need television to survive, but it was just the 
opposite when it first started.” Sports and Television, Museum of Broadcast Comms., 
http://web.archive.org/web/20130521181538/http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=sportsa
ndte (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
 46. To put it in perspective, last year’s Super Bowl was watched by 111.3 million viewers. Scott 
Collins, Super Bowl’s on a New Ratings High, Again, L.A. Times (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/07/entertainment/la-et-super-bowl-ratings-20120207. Not all 
leagues saw television for the opportunity it was. The NHL, for example, started broadcasting games 
as early as 1956. However, the majority of owners thought it a terrible idea and refused to take out 
arena seats to make room for the cameras. As a result, instead of being the first pro league with 
regularly televised games they became the last; and the league delayed the growth of its fan base for 
decades. See generally Bruce Dowbiggin, Money Players (2007). 
 47. United States v. NFL (NFL I), 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953), superseded by statute, Sports 
Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, § 1, 75 Stat. 732, as recognized in Shaw v. Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 48. Id. 
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when a team from the target market—the home team—is either playing 
at home or broadcasting its away game in that market.49 
Employing a rule of reason analysis, the court determined that the 
prohibition on selling broadcast rights into another team’s home market 
when that other team was playing at home was a valid restriction on 
broadcast rights.50 The court accepted the justification that the restriction 
protected gate receipts, that gate receipts were central to team profit, and 
that team profit was essential to the maintenance of intra-league, 
competitive parity.51 However, the court also decided that the NFL 
overreached when it attempted to restrict the sale of rights into another 
market when there was not another team physically playing within that 
market.52 
Although a partial victory, the decision was problematic for the 
NFL. In the early 1960s the NFL—like most other professional leagues—
realized that centralizing or “pooling” broadcast rights was an avenue to 
increase overall league broadcast revenues.53 This type of cooperation 
often inspires antitrust concerns. Specifically, section 1 of the Sherman 
Act forbids independent competitors joining together to centralize 
output and dictate a cartel price to consumers;54 in this case the direct 
consumer is the broadcaster.55 
Nonetheless, it would of course be counterproductive to prevent all 
cooperation in a league. To express it in antitrust terms, a joint venture 
such as is the NFL has a variety of pro-competitive restraints of varying 
severity.56 As Judge Allan Grim noted in 1953, and as the Supreme Court 
itself later held, “the interest in maintaining a competitive balance 
 
 49. For example, the San Francisco 49ers could not broadcast its games to a station in Seattle 
when (1) the Seattle Seahawks are playing in Seattle or (2) the Seahawks are broadcasting into the 
Seattle market a Seahawks game that is being played elsewhere. 
 50. NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 324. 
 51. Id. at 325–26. 
 52. Id. at 326–27. 
 53. See Lacie L. Kaiser, Note, Revisiting the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961: A Call for Equitable 
Antitrust Immunity from Section One of the Sherman Act for All Professional Sport Leagues, 
54 DePaul L. Rev. 1237, 1243 (2005). This of course highlights a basic economic tenet: a single entity 
with market power can charge greater prices for its good than can several competitors acting 
autonomously in the same market. 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  
 55. Concern for the occurrence of such behavior is noted by the courts and has been stated as 
follows: “So long as no agreement” other than one made by the cartelists sitting on the board of the 
joint venture, “explicitly listed the prices to be charged, the companies could act as monopolies 
through the ‘joint venture.’” Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 335 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 56. See James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims After 
American Needle, 21 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 517, 520, 527, 530, 540–41 (2011). 
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among . . . athletic teams is legitimate and important.”57 To bring an 
exciting league to the market, some cooperation is needed and 
permitted.58 Rather than continue to challenge Judge Grim’s consent 
decree, however, the NFL decided to evade antitrust entirely. The NFL 
successfully lobbied for a statutory exemption specifically for the 
“pooling” of broadcast rights, and thus the Sports Broadcasting Act (the 
“SBA”) was born.59 The SBA excludes from antitrust scrutiny the pooling 
of team broadcast rights by the NFL, National Basketball Association 
("NBA"), National Hockey League (“NHL”), and Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”), for sale to a broadcaster.60 As discussed below, the enactment of 
this statute was only the first volley in the antitrust/regulatory tug-of-war 
over sports telecasts. 
B. The Regulatory and Antitrust Tug-of-War 
Courts and scholars have rightfully—if not disdainfully—referred to 
the SBA as “special interest legislation.”61 What is not noted by antitrust 
scholars and courts is that the SBA was, and still is, consistent with 
regulatory mechanisms contrived to support “localism” and other policy 
goals. Specifically, Congress and the FCC have stated expressly that 
“local” programming on “free over-the-air” broadcast is in the “public 
interest.”62 However, the siphoning effect that national telecasts can have 
 
 57. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984). The Court’s recent 
antitrust case continues to recognize this long standing principle that competitive balance in sports 
leagues is an “interest that may well justify a variety of collective decisions made by the teams.” Am. 
Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010). 
 58.  It is entirely possible that what is required to insure intra-league competitive parity will 
change over time. As discussed, American Needle is one case that examines the “economic reality” of 
the day. See supra note 57. The standard of “economic reality” invites a case-by-case study of 
circumstances and industries at the time of the lawsuit that should make past precedents on the merits 
less persuasive than in other areas of the law. How past precedent is handled is of particular 
importance in broadcast suits where technology has enabled drastic shifts in consumer demand. 
 59. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, § 1, 75 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006)). The SBA carves out an exemption for a delineated class of collective 
agreements between some professional sports leagues and “sponsored telecasting.” Under the SBA, 
antitrust law “shall not apply to any joint agreement [involving] organized professional team sports of 
football, baseball, basketball or hockey . . . in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football, 
baseball, basketball or hockey.” Id.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 1992); Shaw v. Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97-5184, 1998 WL 419765, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1998), aff’d, 
172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999); David L. Anderson, Note, The Sports Broadcasting Act: Calling It What It 
Is—Special Interest Legislation, 17 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 945, 947–58 (1995); Bradley W. 
Crandall, Note, The DirecTV NFL Sunday Ticket: An Economic Plea for Antitrust Law Immunity, 
79 Wash. U. L.Q. 287, 309 (2001); Lacie L. Kaiser, Note, The Flight from Single-Entity Structured 
Sport Leagues, 2 DePaul J. Sports L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 23 (2004). 
 62. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2006) (considering the interference with local programming a factor 
in determining public interest for the purpose of granting licenses). 
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on local markets is viewed as destructive to the structural support 
provided local broadcasters.63 Therefore, the local broadcaster is provided 
regulatory protection from national telecasts.64 
Local broadcasters must survive on local advertising revenue.65 
Therefore, to support “localism” under the adopted structural method, 
the FCC also had to protect the revenue stream of those community-
based broadcasters.66 If a distant broadcaster could send its signal of 
duplicative, or more popular, programming into the local market, it 
might help consumers but jeopardize the delicate balance of “localism” 
created by the FCC.67 Even in the early days, as the sports telecast 
 
 63. See Inquiry into Sports Programming Migration, 9 No. 7 FCC Rcd. 1649, ¶ 11 (1994); Cox, 
supra note 13, at 572. 
 64. The manner by which the FCC effectuates the sports broadcast rules and provides general 
protection of local broadcast revenues is a series of archaic and complex systems of mandatory 
carriage provisions, carriage limitations in the network-program-syndicated exclusivity protection 
rules, non-duplication rules, and sports programming blackout rules. 
Non-duplication rules: 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92, 76.93, 76.106, 76.120, 76.122 (2012). Commercial 
television station licensees that have contracted with a broadcast network for the exclusive distribution 
rights to that network’s programming within a specified geographic area are entitled to block a local 
cable system from carrying any programming of a more distant television broadcast station that 
duplicates that network programming. Id. § 76.92(a). Commercial broadcast stations may assert these 
non-duplication rights regardless of whether or not the network programming is actually being 
retransmitted by the local cable system and regardless of when—or if—the network programming is 
scheduled to be broadcast. Id. § 76.120(b). With respect to satellite operators, the network non-
duplication rule applies only to network signals transmitted by superstations, not to network signals 
transmitted by other distant network affiliates. Id. § 76.122(a). 
Ex-syndication rules: Id. §§ 76.101, 76.103, 76.106, 76.120, 76.123. Cable systems that serve at least 
1000 subscribers may be required, upon proper notification, to provide syndicated protection to 
broadcasters who have contracted with program suppliers for exclusive exhibition rights to certain 
programs within specific geographic areas, whether or not the cable system affected is carrying the 
station requesting this protection. Id. § 76.106(a). With respect to satellite operators, the syndicated 
exclusivity rule applies only to syndicated programming transmitted by superstations, not to 
syndicated programming transmitted by other distant broadcast stations. Id. § 76.123(a). 
 65. Deborah Potter et al., Local TV: Audience Declines as Revenue Bounces Back, The Pew Res. 
Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism (Nov. 3, 2013), http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/ 
local-tv-audience-declines-as-revenue-bounces-back; Brian Stelter, Broadcasters Circle Wagons 
Against a TV Streaming Upstart, N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/ 
business/media/aereo-has-tv-networks-circling-the-wagons.html; Brian Stelter, Local TV News Is 
Following Print’s Path, Study Says, N.Y. Times, (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/ 
business/media/local-tv-news-is-following-prints-path-study-says.html. 
 66. See Potter, supra note 65. 
 67. The FCC’s first decision regarding conventional broadcast television began the long-standing 
commitment to promote locally oriented television programming. For instance, the protection of local 
broadcasters inspired one of the FCC’s first broadcast rules, the Chain Broadcasting Rules. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 311. These rules defended the FCC’s regulatory scheme by constraining the influence of the 
dominant broadcast networks of the day. When challenged, the Supreme Court tacitly approved of the 
FCC’s rationale in enacting the rules and emphasized that “[l]ocal program service is a vital part of 
community life” and that regulation was required to guarantee stations were “ready, able, and willing 
to serve the needs of the local community by broadcasting such outstanding local events.” Nat’l Broad. 
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 203 (1943) (upholding the Chain Broadcasting Rules). 
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industry developed, it became clear that (1) there was strong consumer 
demand for such events,68 and (2) higher powered transmissions would 
allow broadcasts to travel beyond the immediate localities of a given 
team. These developments create special problems for the FCC in 
particular because they could undermine the its structurally engineered 
licensing regime by siphoning away local advertising dollars. If local 
broadcasters are unable to maintain profits and leave the market, the 
FCC loses its chosen champion of local content promotion.69 
And therein lies the tension: in the court of Judge Grim, the reach of 
one local team into the region of another was viewed as beneficial to sports 
consumers; however, in the view of the regulator, such reach is potentially 
destructive to the local broadcasters’ revenue and, by association, 
destructive to FCC policy.70 Therefore, the sports broadcast rules, among 
other regulations, were adopted to protect sports leagues and the potential 
erosion of local broadcasters’ exhibition rights.71 Also important are the 
cable access rules, which require sale of cable-owned networks to 
competitors at reasonable rates.72 Although these rules have recently 
expired for most cable networks, competitor access to cable-owned 
regional sports networks remain under FCC control.73 
Antitrust agencies have long recognized that markets change, 
business organizations evolve or disappear, and new revenue streams are 
 
 68. See William Browning, The History of Sports Television Broadcasting, Yahoo! Sports 
(Sept. 3, 2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/top/news?slug=ac-6713258. 
 69. For example, effective January 1, 1990, the FCC’s syndicated exclusivity rules mandated cable 
system blackouts of any syndicated programming carried on distant television signals at the request of 
any local broadcaster holding exclusive local exhibition rights. Ex-syndication rules: 47 C.F.R. 
§§ 76.101, 76.103, 76.106, 76.120, 76.123 (2013). Satellite broadcast carriage has received significant 
focus over the years, concentrating on distant signals beginning in 1988 with the Satellite Home 
Viewer Act of 1988 (“SHVA”), Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (1988), local signals in 1999 
with the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (“SHVIA”), Title I of the Intellectual 
Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 
app. I, 1501A-521 (Nov. 29, 1999), and significantly refining the rules in the Satellite Home Viewer 
Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004, Tit. IX, Div. J of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 3393 ( 2004). 
 70. United States v. NFL (NFL I), 116 F. Supp. 319, 326–27 (E.D. Pa. 1953), superseded by statute, 
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, § 1, 75 Stat. 732, as recognized in Shaw v. Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 72. 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(4)(A) (2006) (“The Commission shall have the authority to . . . determine the 
maximum reasonable rates that a cable operator may establish.”). See FCC Encyclopedia: Evolution of 
Cable Television, FCC (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/evolution-cable-television. 
 73. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 
106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). See Amy Schatz, FCC Lets 
Cable Access Rules Expire, Keeps Some Protections for Cable Competitors, Wall St. J. (Oct. 5, 2012, 
10:47 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443635404578038763502833172.html. 
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discovered as technology advances.74 As the dilemma just described 
shows, the structural format adopted by the FCC to promote localism 
and shield competitors from cable is showing its age and inability to 
adapt—a fact acknowledged by the current FCC.75 The tension between 
antitrust and regulation revealed by sports telecasts is illustrative of the 
need for greater maturity in both arenas.76 
The following Part focuses on the development of antitrust and 
joint-venture jurisprudence—with a quantitative analysis of the special 
case of sports leagues and sports league telecast joint ventures. The Part 
also briefly analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent sports league antitrust 
case, American Needle.77 A normative analysis of American Needle reveals 
a judicially viable two-part test.78 The consistency of this interpretive 
construct is confirmed and tested against the original dataset of prior 
sports league jurisprudence. 
 
 74. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy 82–83 (6th rev. ed. 1994). 
Schumpeter defined the free market system as a “process of Creative Destruction.” Id. As Schumpeter 
noted, “in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process” that is defined by constant 
“industrial mutation.” Id. This process “incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within” 
destroying old structures and “incessantly creating” new ones. Id. at 83 (citation omitted). 
 75. See, e.g., Revision of the Comm’n’s Program Access Rules, 27 FCC Rcd. 12605, 12748 (2012) 
(statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
FCC-12-123A1.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Ajit Pai]. “I therefore believe the exclusivity ban has 
outlived its statutory purpose as well as its constitutional justification. The market has changed, and 
our rules must follow.” Id. at 145 (citation omitted). See Schatz, supra note 73; see also Press Release, 
FCC, Statement of FCC Commissioner Robert M. McDowell Regarding the Media Bureau’s Request 
for Comment on the Petition Seeking Elimination of the Sports Blackout Rule (2012) [hereinafter 
Statement of McDowell] , available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
311978A1.pdf. “Taking a fresh look at this 36-year-old rule could be constructive as we look for rules 
to streamline and modernize. . . . [T]he economics and structure of both the sports and 
communications industries have experienced dramatic evolutions. . . . It is appropriate for us to re-
examine the rule in light of marketplace changes.” Id. 
Cable has become the consumers’ choice as against reliance on free, over-the-air broadcast. For 
example, according to the Leichtman Research Group, an organization who studies entertainment and 
media trends, about 101 million households in the United States were cable and satellite subscribers in 
2012—this is about eighty-seven percent of U.S. households—and the number has not changed since 
2009. TV Channel Blackouts Becoming More Common as Profits Stall, USA Today Tech (July 16, 
2012, 12:57 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-07-15/television-blackouts/ 
56236886/1. Antitrust, in contrast to regulation, would not protect a local competitor against the very 
type of pro-consumer competition antitrust is intended to support. 
 76. There is evidence that the FCC and antitrust regulators are both well aware and responding in 
accordance with market changes. See, e.g., discussion, supra note 75 (noting the FCC’s recent sunset of 
the cable access rules and the proposal to repeal the sports blackout rules); see also discussion, infra 
note 84(noting that sports telecast antitrust claim survives 12(b)(6) motion). 
 77. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 78. Id. at 2209–12. 
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II.  Sports Telecasts: An Illustrative Example of Joint Venture 
Analysis 
A. The Basics of Joint Venture Antitrust Analysis 
As noted, antitrust as a product of common law has been able to 
adapt to changes in business structure. But in the face of one increasingly 
popular business form—the joint venture—agencies and courts have 
wavered and produced conflicting results. The pro-competitive reasons for 
joint ventures are varied: increased efficiency of production, creation of 
economies of scale, and research and development of new technologies are 
just a few examples.79 The problem with joint ventures is that they involve 
an agreement among competitors that may create an unreasonable 
“restraint of trade” in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.80 
In the realm of antitrust analysis, industry participants face various 
prohibitions, but the most relevant to this discussion are those found in 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.81 Broadly speaking, section 1 
prohibits “any contract” among competitors that leads to a “restraint of 
trade.”82 The Supreme Court has clarified that the Act applies only to 
“unreasonable” restraints of trade.83 
To state a claim under section 1, plaintiffs must plead facts that 
plausibly suggest “(1) an agreement or conspiracy among two or more 
persons or distinct business entities; (2) by which the persons or entities 
intend to harm or restrain competition; and (3) which actually injures 
competition.”84 In addition, the plaintiff must allege that each defendant 
had “a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve 
an unlawful object.”85 In its analysis of what is deemed an “unreasonable” 
restraint of trade, the Court has, in all but a few particular arenas, adopted 
a “rule of reason” standard of review.86 In an oft repeated refrain, the true 
 
 79. See, e.g., Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Competition Issues in Joint Ventures 9–11 
(2001). See generally Carolyn Oddie, Joint Ventures—Achieving a Balance: Assisting Pro-Competitive 
Ventures Without Permitting Obvious Anti-Competitive Behaviour, 26 U. New S. Wales L.J. 321 (2003); 
Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 Geo. L.J. 1605 (1986). 
 80. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 81. Id. §§ 1–2. 
 82. Id. § 1 (emphasis added). 
 83. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911). 
 84. Les Shockley Racing, Inc. v. Nat’l Hot Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 85. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). 
 86. The rule of reason has been criticized for its broad and amorphous interpretation. See, e.g., 
Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 Calif. 
L. Rev. 263, 315 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 11–12 
(1984); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in U.S. 
Antitrust Law, 17 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 591, 613 (2012); Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of 
Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1375, 1389 (2009). There is no set criteria, nor 
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test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is “such as merely regulates 
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition” and is therefore condemned 
under the Act.87 
Sports league telecasts are particularly susceptible to a section 1 
challenge because the league itself is a group of horizontal competitors 
linked together by an overarching league agreement.88 In contrast, the 
focus of section 2 is not on “agreement” between competitors, but 
unilateral activities by a single entity—in particular an entity with 
“monopoly power.”89 Here too the industry of sports telecast is potentially 
vulnerable to antitrust review, as it involves titans of two industries—
namely “the league” (arguably the holder of monopoly power in the 
relevant sports market) and the telecaster (arguably the holder of 
monopoly power somewhere in the communications content and 
distribution chain). Indeed, many of the issues, concerns, and prior 
litigation of the sports telecast industry involve both Sherman Act 
sections 1 and 2 allegations against both leagues and telecasters.90 
The two sections not only have different claim elements, they also 
have disparate levels of judicial scrutiny. The intensity of scrutiny for 
alleged section 1 violations is relatively high, while scrutiny for section 2 
 
are certain types of evidence automatically prescribed predominate weight, but courts must generally 
consider: “[(1)] the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; [(2) the business’s] 
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; [(3)] the nature of the restraint and its effect, 
actual or probable[;] [(4)] [t]he history of the restraint; [(5)] the evil believed to exist; [(6)] the reason 
for adopting the particular remedy[; and (7)] the purpose or end sought to be attained.” Bd. of Trade 
of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 87. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. 
 88. See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389–91 (9th Cir. 1984); 
James L. Brock Jr., Comment, A Substantive Test for Sherman Act Plurality: Applications for 
Professional Sports Leagues, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 999, 999–1000 (1985); Gary R. Roberts, Sports 
Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague 
Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 219, 229 (1984). 
 89. See infra Part III; see also, Hovenkamp, supra note 16. Hovenkamp notes that due to the 
contract between the NFL and Reebok, “whether the NFL is treated as a single entity or a 
combination of separate actors the challenge in this case would have implicated § 1 as well as possibly 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act.” Id. at 7. 
 90. See, e.g., U.S. Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1341, 1349–50 (2d Cir. 1988) (alleging 
Sherman Act § 1 and § 2 claims including willful acquisition of monopoly in relevant television 
submarket); Ass’n for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577, 590 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (per curiam) (alleging illegal tying arrangement for purchase of women’s and men’s 
championship by television network); Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(alleging Sherman Act § 1 and § 2 claims that leagues and cable operators are conspiring to eliminate 
competition by distributing only league authorized out-of-market games); Warner Amex Cable 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. ABC, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 537, 544 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (alleging Sherman Act § 1 and 
§ 2 claim of conspiracy and monopolization based on exclusive distributorship rights). 
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is relatively low.91 As a result, private plaintiff attorneys look to identify 
section 1 violations whereas defendant attorneys are quick to seek 
characterization of client activity as “unilateral” rather than 
conspiratorial to face the less stringent standard of review under 
section 2.92 
To succeed in a section 1 claim, a plaintiff “must first establish a 
combination or some form of concerted action between at least two 
legally distinct economic entities” since “[u]nilateral conduct on the part 
of a single person or enterprise falls outside the purview” of section 1.93 
Sports leagues are fairly unique among joint ventures in that their 
cooperation is essential for the very creation of the market.94 As such, 
they are the ideal, “pure” example of joint venture antitrust analysis 
because the element of cooperation is, in certain instances, 
uncontestable; therefore, the defense can easily establish that the league 
is not a naked cartel, but is a legitimate joint venture.95 That leaves only 
the benefits of cooperation and the business justifications up for judicial 
 
 91. See Freedom Holdings Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 226 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he scheme as 
alleged threatens to become a permanent, nationwide cartel.”); Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, 
Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 782 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[A]ntitrust laws seek to prevent rather than protect cartel 
profits.”); Vogel v. Am. Soc’y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[B]uyer cartels, the 
object of which is to force the prices that suppliers charge the members of the cartel below the 
competitive level, are illegal per se.”); Int’l Outsourcing Servs., LLC v. Blistex, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 
860, 865–66 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding that a buyers’ cartel are per se violations of the Sherman Act). 
 92. The promise of treble damages encourages plaintiffs’ attorneys to seek out such opportunities 
and the sports league is an obvious, if not tempting, target. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731 
(1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)). 
 93. Capital Imaging Assocs. P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
 94. MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 316, 334 (2d Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that 
“[p]er se treatment is not appropriate” in considering sports leagues’ restraints). Per se rules apply 
where it “facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition 
and decrease output.” See Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1187 (S.D. Cal. 2002); see 
also Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“Per se liability is reserved for only those agreements 
that are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their 
illegality” and should not be applied “where the economic impact of certain practices is not 
immediately obvious”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 
666 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Per se violations are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling 
competition” and are characterized as “plainly anti-competitive and lacking any redeeming virtue.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95. There are limits of course. Joint ventures may not serve as cover to anticompetitive behavior. 
As noted by the Supreme Court, a “‘contract, combination . . . or conspiracy,’ that is necessary or 
useful to a joint venture is still a ‘contract, combination . . . or conspiracy’ if it ‘deprives the 
marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking.’” Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 190 
(2010) (citations omitted) (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 
(1984)); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (“[J]oint 
ventures have no immunity from antitrust laws.”). 
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review.96 It is precisely that element of essential cooperation that 
contributes to a fascinating judicial history of antitrust enforcement, most 
recently capped by the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle.97 
B. AMERICAN NEEDLE—A Two-Part Test for Joint Ventures? 
American Needle is a clothing manufacturer that for many years 
made clothing with NFL team logos pursuant to a nonexclusive license.98 
After a time, the joint venture that managed NFL intellectual property 
(“the NFL Properties”) changed its licensing policy and issued an 
exclusive license for NFL logos to Reebok—thus excluding Reebok’s 
rival American Needle.99 American Needle brought suit under antitrust 
law claiming in part that the NFL violated section 1 of the Sherman Act 
by pooling the individual member-teams’ intellectual property rights in 
logos and merchandise.100 The defendant claimed, in part, that it simply 
refused to deal with American Needle in what constituted a legitimate, 
unilateral act of a single entity.101 
As stated previously, the first part of any section 1 claim is to 
establish that entities have joined in a contract, agreement or conspiracy 
with one another.102 However, agencies and courts have struggled with 
how literal an interpretation to apply to these words.103 Of particular 
relevance is the rather obvious point that it takes at least two entities to 
contract, agree, or conspire. If there is only one entity, there is no 
section 1 violation. But what constitutes a “single entity” is not obvious. 
For example, the Court took considerable time to acknowledge that 
internal divisions of a business might need to cooperate to accomplish 
the single goal of the corporate head.104 The Court left open, however, 
 
 96. There is a tension in antitrust law between which error is preferred: erroneous condemnation of 
a beneficial practice or the escape from condemnation by an anticompetitive practice. See Chi. Prof’l 
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 676 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Markets slowly but surely undermine 
practices that injure consumers. Competition does not undermine judicial decisions, so the costs of 
wrongly condemning a beneficial practice may exceed the costs of wrongly tolerating a harmful one.”). 
 97. 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 98. Complaint ¶¶ 6–8, Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans, La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 
2007) (No. 04-7806), 2004 WL 3123822.  
 99.  Id. ¶¶ 11–14. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Memorandum in Support of NFL Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–2, Am. 
Needle, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941 (No. 04-7806), 2005 WL 6087988. 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 103. For a brief, historical journey of the Sherman Act and its application by the Court, see 
generally Nolan Ezra Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the Cartelization Standard, 
38 Vand. L. Rev. 1125 (1985). 
 104. The Sherman Act was signed into law in 1890. The Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 17 (2006)). It was not until 1984, nearly one-hundred years 
later, that the Copperweld Court addressed the business and affiliates question. Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768–69 (1984). Copperweld held that a wholly owned 
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how attenuated the subsidiary-parent relationship could be in order to 
constitute a single entity incapable of the concerted activity that violates 
section 1.105 In American Needle, the Court determined that the thirty-
two member teams did not rise to the level of a “single entity” for the 
purpose of selling intellectual property.106 
To some, American Needle ostensibly stands for the end of the “single 
entity” defense for sports leagues.107 But this overstates American Needle 
and understates the judicial history of concerted action analysis.108 In the 
face of prior antitrust claims, sports leagues and other joint ventures have 
asserted that for certain purposes the members of the venture act as one 
independent decisionmaking center and should therefore be shielded from 
section 1 scrutiny.109 However, as seen in Copperweld Corporation v. 
Independence Tube Corporation, United States v. Sealy, and Broadcast 
Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the Court has neither 
accepted nor discarded these arguments automatically.110 As stated in 
American Needle, the Court has “long held” that it will look to 
“substance” of the business and to the “economic realities” of the 
operations to determine single entity status.111 In this regard, it appears 
that American Needle merely affirms, rather than redirects, prior 
precedent holding that the proper analysis of joint ventures begins by a 
“functional analysis” of the alleged concerted action.112 
But exactly how the Court proceeds with this analysis and how the 
Court describes that process is confused and has arguably already raised 
 
subsidiary could not “conspire” with its parent as the two together acted as the functional equivalent 
of a single economic entity. Id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 201 (2010). 
 107. McKeown, supra note 56, at 517; Judd E. Stone & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Formalism Is 
Dead! Long Live Antitrust Formalism! Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL, Cato Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 369, 371 (2010); Daniel A. Schwartz, Note, Shutting the Back Door: Using American Needle to 
Cure the Problem of Improper Product Definition, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 295, 314 (2011). 
 108. See infra notes 109–113 and accompanying text. 
 109. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767, 769–70; Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel 
Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming single entity status granted to certification 
authority); Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 999 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1993) (granting single entity status 
to restaurant chain franchises with anticompetitive agreement); S.F. Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 
966, 971 (C.D. Cal 1974) (granting single entity status to the NHL). 
 110. Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752; Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. (BMI), 441 U.S. 1 
(1979); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
 111. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 191; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 
451, 466–67 (1992); Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 773 n.21; Sealy, 388 U.S. at 352. 
 112. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 192 (“[S]ubstance, not form, should determine whether a[n] . . . 
entity is capable of conspiring under § 1.” (alteration in original)); BMI, 441 U.S. at 14 (noting that the 
Court will look to the economic realities of the venture); Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769 (noting that the 
relevant inquiry is if “independent centers of decisionmaking” are joined together); Deutscher Tennis 
Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 834 (3d Cir. 2010); Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 
54 F.3d 1125, 1132 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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problems of interpretation for the lower courts.113 Indeed, the “single 
entity” dicta is truly unfortunate because it misleads courts to examine 
the necessity of cooperation of the organization in general rather than 
the cooperation of the organization in relation to the necessity of the 
activity at issue. The Supreme Court itself spoke of general cooperation 
of the NFL but decided the case based on the importance of the restraint 
at issue—exclusive merchandising rights—to the NFL’s core purpose.114 
To unravel American Needle, and to give clear, uncomplicated 
instruction to the lower courts and certainty to joint venture participants, 
this Article argues that American Needle dictates (or at least permits) a 
two-part test. The test comes into play after there is a plausible argument 
that there is an agreement, contract or conspiracy.115 For example, almost 
any professional league that permits independent team ownership would 
meet this threshold. The test first makes the following inquiry: Given 
that there is plausible concerted action, does the challenged activity 
constitute a core or central activity of the joint venture? Importantly, the 
focus of this inquiry is on the relation of the activity to the joint venture, 
not on the nature of how the entities cooperate or need cooperation in 
general. In other words, to the extent that there is a “single entity” 
inquiry, it is made only in connection to the challenged activity and not 
to the general operation of the venture. This first prong of the test must 
of course employ a rule of reason analysis but it has the advantage of 
limiting that analysis by keeping it tethered to the challenged activity. 
The answer to the first inquiry will be either “yes it is a core activity” 
or “no it is not,” but neither conclusion will end the section 1 analysis. This 
is different than the classic single entity analysis for which a finding that 
defendant is a single entity will terminate the section 1 analysis and leave 
the plaintiff the option to launch a more challenging section 2 claim. The 
answer will, however, determine the standard by which the second 
question is assessed. The second part of the test inquires: Is the restraint 
at issue unreasonable and therefore an illegal one?116 If the restraint has 
been found to be “core” to the joint venture, then for this second 
question the court should treat the restraint as almost per se reasonable. 
If the restraint was not found to be core, then this second question 
should be answered by use of traditional rule of reason standards. 
 
 113. See Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 114. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 201. 
 115. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 186 (“The question whether an arrangement is a contract, 
combination, or conspiracy is different from and antecedent to the question whether it unreasonably 
restrains trade.”). 
 116. Id. at 203. 
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The Court does not describe its analysis in such a formulized 
manner.117 But the narrow holding of American Needle is consistent with 
the two-part test described here. The Court noted that the NFL’s 
licensing activities constituted concerted action within the meaning of 
section 1.118 The Court noted that “[a]lthough NFL teams have common 
interests such as promoting the NFL brand, they are still separate, profit-
maximizing entities, and their interests in licensing team trademarks are 
not necessarily aligned.”119 In other words, using a quick rule of reason 
analysis the Court found this particular agreement was not core to the 
NFL’s “common interests.”120 Next, the Court noted that given that 
conclusion, the restraint examined under a rule of reason analysis was 
found unreasonable.121 
The advantage of formulizing the test is that it quickly and easily 
demonstrates that the same league may be permitted to agree for certain 
“core” activities and yet found to illegally cooperate for other activities.122 
For example, consider the NFL’s practice of pooling all member broadcast 
rights for sale as nation-wide telecasts.123 The first part of the test would 
inquire as to whether the production of telecast rights is “core” to the 
NFL’s business. The NFL produces games for exhibition; arguably in 
today’s world “exhibition” means video exhibition as much as tickets for 
in-person viewing.124 Indeed, given the overwhelming importance of 
 
 117. Id. at 196. If the restraint does join independent centers of decisionmaking “the court must 
[then] decide whether the restraint is an unreasonable and therefore illegal one.” Id. It is consistent to 
read this as a two-part test. First the court decides if the restraint impermissibly joins together 
independent centers and then (if the answer to part one is yes) the unreasonableness of the restraint is 
considered. An example of possible confusion and improper conflation of these two parts may be seen 
in Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 485–86 (utilizing stare decisis to preempt more full rule of reason 
analysis). 
 118. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 195. 
 119. Id. at 198. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. at 200–01. 
 122. Hovenkamp, supra note 16. This is also exactly the question Judge Easterbrook asked in 
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996). Looking 
specifically at broadcast restraints the NBA adopted, Judge Easterbrook noted that sports “are 
sufficiently diverse that it is essential to investigate their organization and ask Copperweld’s functional 
question one league at a time—and perhaps one facet of a league at a time.” Id. Indeed, Easterbrook 
commented that “an organization such as the NBA is best understood as one firm when selling 
broadcast rights” where it competes with thousands of entertainment producers, “but is best 
understood as a joint venture when curtailing competition for players who have few other market 
opportunities.” Id. 
 123. See Phillip Miller, An Overview of NFL Revenues and Costs, in The Economics of the 
National Football League 55, 64–66, 89 (Kevin G. Quinn ed., 2012). 
 124. See Kevin Clark, Game Changer: NFL Scrambles to Fill Seats, Wall St. J. (July 2, 2012, 
3:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303561504577495083707417526.html; Miranda 
Green, Why Rising Ticket Prices and Technology Lead NFL Fans to Stay Home, Daily Beast 
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broadcast revenue to the NFL, it is fairly easy to assert that the centralized 
sale of broadcast rights is central to the “economic reality” of providing 
competitive football.125 
Because the first part of the test confirms the centrality of broadcast 
revenue, the second part of the test should be a less intrusive rule of 
reason analysis—almost invoking the per se legality of a section 2 single 
entity review without dismissing the section 1 inquiry entirely.126 To 
continue the example of the NFL’s pooling rights for national broadcast, 
the second part of the test would consider if the restraints on pooling are 
reasonable to attain the stated goal: the exhibition of league competition.127 
 
(Dec. 23, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/23/why-rising-ticket-prices-
and-technology-are-leading-nfl-fans-to-stay-home.html. 
 125. Stephen F. Ross & Benjamin Woodworth, Penn State Law, More Like the United 
Nations Than McDonald’s: Economic and Policy Aspects of the NFL Labor Dispute 3 (2010) 
(stating that all NFL broadcast TV and radio, and licensing revenue is shared equally among teams; 
ticket revenue is partially shared with sixty-six percent staying with the home team and thirty-four 
percent split evenly among all teams (not including luxury box suite sales)). 
 126. In American Needle, the intellectual property rights at issue (the marketing of logos and 
merchandise) was a small percentage of the revenue stream for the NFL as an entity. Brief for 
Petitioner at 4, Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 3004479, at *4 
(reporting $2.9 billion in NFL merchandise sales in 2001). See Jake I. Fisher, The NFL’s Current 
Business Model and the Potential 2011 Lockout (May 4, 2010) (unpublished student work, Harvard 
University), available at http://harvardsportsanalysis.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/the-nfl-business-
model-and-potential-lockout.pdf. Using the Green Bay Packers as a case study, Fisher compiled data 
showing that in 2009, NFL Properties accounted for $36.5 million of the team’s total revenue versus 
radio and television deals ($94.5 million), pro shop sales ($43.7 million) and ticket sales ($47.3 million) 
among other things. Id. at 20. 
Arguably, in the two-part analysis advocated for here, the first part of the two-part test would 
result in exactly the finding of the Court—that merchandising of intellectual property is not a “core 
activity.” Indeed, the Court itself seemed not to analyze the restraint in connection to the league but 
rather just how important the cooperation was to the league in general. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 195-
203. Again, this confuses the relevant issue—how important the restraint is to the particular league. 
The Court mentioned that teams have separate ownership and revenue streams and compete for 
“fans, for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and player personnel.” Id. at 184. But these 
examples speak more to the general enterprise of league activity rather than to any analysis of how the 
activity at issue relates to the enterprise—the consolidation of the intellectual property of team logos, 
ostensibly to build the NFL brand. Moreover, with the decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma, the Court indicated that the first part of the two-part test may not be a 
separate question at all but merely a means to establish the standard of review for, what is called here, 
the second part of the test, 468 U.S. 85, 113–20 (1984). 
But, in the alternative, it is also feasible that given the particular facts of the case the Court was 
able to perform the first part of the two-part test in “the twinkling of an eye.” Cal. Dental Ass’n v. 
FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999); Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39. It is also consistent to conclude 
that certain facts with respect to other types of restraints will demand more extensive inquiry. This 
interpretation will leave open ended the definition of a “safety zone” from section 1 scrutiny and 
leaves the defining of the boundaries to the courts for a case-by-case assessment. 
 127. If the activity at issue is truly core to the industry, to adopt an inquiry of whether the restraint 
is the “least restrictive” would dilute industry incentives to experiment with new business models and 
new ways of maximizing revenue streams as consumer demand shifts. See Claire E. Trunzo, Ancillary 
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Here the inquiry would be slightly different: an almost rebuttable 
presumption that the restraint was reasonably ancillary to the “core 
activity.” In this hypothetical, the NFL would likely assert that the pooling 
of rights was necessary to guarantee an even split of revenue among teams 
which, in turn, is intended to provide each team the resources to maintain 
competitive parity. This is a rational—but not unassailable—justification 
that will ultimately turn on an empirical analysis of each team’s market 
power. The advantage of such an approach, however, is that it incorporates 
the rigor of the section 1 analysis and the more permissive approach of 
section 2 analysis in the same test. If done correctly, the test will identify 
anticompetitive areas of greatest concern and embolden industry to make 
pro-competitive innovations in their areas of core activity. 
Antitrust results under this test may vary based on the activity and 
they may also vary depending on the league being examined. For 
example, MLB does not divide revenues from broadcast equally.128 MLB 
depends on a “taxation” system and other mechanisms to support 
competitive parity among teams.129 Therefore, if MLB attempts to 
centralize broadcast rights, it may face vastly different antitrust liability 
compared to the NFL. This league-by-league, activity-by-activity analysis 
is consistent with the decades of antitrust jurisprudence examined below. 
Indeed, this basic approach may be loosely applied to all legitimate 
joint ventures and is not the sole reserve of sports leagues.130 Such an 
approach is consistent with a more comprehensive view of joint ventures 
that has gradually been developing in antitrust jurisprudence.131 Rather 
than articulating a pure “zone of protection” for all restraints by joint 
ventures, once the legitimacy of the venture itself is established, the 
restraint’s relation to the purpose of the joint venture is the focus for 
determining the level of antitrust scrutiny. The result is a continuum of 
scrutiny rather than a bifurcation between “per se” and “rule of reason” 
analysis.132 This framework is consistent with past precedent on joint 
 
Restraints in a Competitive Global Economy: Does the Possibility Exist for an Ancillary Restriction to 
be Reasonable in Light of Section 1 of the Sherman Act?, 29 Duq. L. Rev. 291, 301 (1991). 
 128. Albert Theodore Powers, The Business of Baseball 226 (2003) 
 129. See Dan Messeloff, Note, The NBA’s Deal with the Devil: The Antitrust Implications of the 
1999 NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 521, 
560–67 (2000). 
 130. The requirement that there is a “legitimate” joint venture speaks to a threshold determination 
that the joint venture is not merely a sham. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006); Polygram 
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 131. See infra notes 133–137 and accompanying text. 
 132. This is consistent also with the Supreme Court’s analysis in California Dental Ass’n, where the 
Court itself stated “our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like 
‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.” Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 
779. One commentator has declared that “the time has come for the courts and agencies to abandon 
these outmoded phrases, which artificially limit fact finders’ discretion.” Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., 
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venture analysis found in the much-cited Dagher.133 It also resurrects to 
some extent the analysis first applied by Chief Justice William Taft in 
United States v. Trenton Potteries,134 a case of increasing popularity. 
Interestingly, as discussed below, this analysis is also consistent with the 
majority of the Sherman Act sports association jurisprudence of the past 
ninety years.135 
C. An Empirical Analysis of Sports League Antitrust 
Jurisprudence 
Some commentators question whether American Needle has killed 
the single entity defense.136 The empirical question to consider here is 
whether the single entity defense ever lived? Moreover, the validity of 
the two-part test described above is analyzed against past precedent. To 
examine these questions, consider again that an antitrust plaintiff will be 
most likely to prevail if her claim can be brought as a section 1 rather 
than section 2 claim.137 From this perspective, sports leagues that are 
already susceptible to claims of cartel-like conduct due to the necessity of 
cooperation in their markets may look to the “single entity” defense as a 
means to imbue certain activities with a presumption of per se legality.138 
To the extent that American Needle abandons this potential protection, 
leagues like all other joint ventures face a rule of reason analysis. A key 
question for agencies, leagues, and plaintiffs’ attorneys is whether this is 
 
Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust Approach for the 21st Century, 82 Ind. 
L.J. 345, 367 (2007); see Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling 
Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 55 (1995); Thomas A. Piraino, 
Jr., An Antitrust Common Law for the Twenty-First Century, 2009 Utah L. Rev. 635, 644 (2009).  
 133. 547 U.S. 1. 
 134. 273 U.S. 392 (1927). See Marc Edelman, Does The NBA Still Have “Market Power?” 
Exploring the Antitrust Implications of an Increasingly Global Market for Men’s Basketball Player 
Labor, 41 Rutgers L.J. 549, 553–54 (2010); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the 
Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 105, 136 (1989); Stucke, supra note 86, at 1399–1400. 
 135. See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The merits of 
the case turn on the characterization of the NBA. Is a sports league a single entity? In that event its 
decisions about telecasting are effectively unreviewable.” (emphasis added) (citing Copperweld Corp. 
v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 758 (1984))). 
 136. See McKeown, supra note 56, at 517; Stone & Wright, supra note 107, at 371; Schwartz, supra 
note 107, at 314. 
 137. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (horizontal price fixing); N. 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (tying arrangements); Fashion Originators’ Guild of 
Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941) (group boycotts); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S. 150, 210 (1940) (price fixing); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 
(1899) (division of markets). 
 138. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
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a radical change that will “change sports law” or simply a continuation of 
past practices.139 
This is largely an empirical question. If the “single entity” theory truly 
shielded sports leagues before American Needle, then there will be 
evidence of that in sports league jurisprudence.140 To establish if that is the 
case, data were collected from all the federal courts for cases filed against 
certain leagues that referenced the single entity defense. Specifically, the 
data encompass section 1 and section 2 challenges that involve the MLB, 
NBA, NHL, NFL, and Major League Soccer (“MLS”).141 In addition, data 
were collected for Sherman Act cases that named the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (“NCAA”) as a defendant. The honors go to the 
MLB for the first antitrust decision in 1922, and the data presented end 
with cases filed in 2012.142 
In examining the raw number of filings, the NCAA is a lightning rod 
for litigation, with thirty-one cases filed against it beginning in 1973 and 
the last recorded in 2012.143 This is a rather remarkable distinction given 
that all of the entities—with the exception of the NBA—have been in 
existence for roughly the same period of time.144 MLS is the quietest with 
a mere four total cases—one of which it appeared as plaintiff against the 
NFL.145 Although these numbers have their own appeal, they tell a story 
that is utterly consistent with a modern, American Needle analysis—the 
more dispersed the “independent centers of decisionmaking” and the 
less identifiable the “core activity,” the more susceptible it will be to 
 
 139. See, e.g., Irwin A. Kishner & Julie Albinsky, Very Much Ado About . . . Nothing, 29 Ent. & 
Sports Law. 1, 3 (2011). 
 140. Such evidence would at least take the form of defensive arguments if not in dispositive use of 
the argument in judicial determinations. 
 141. For purposes of this Article, Major League Soccer (“MLS”) will be used to refer to the 
professional soccer league in the United States. 
 142. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
 143. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 144. The NCAA was founded in 1906 with the first NCAA bowl championship played in 1921. 
History, NCAA (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/ 
About+the+NCAA/History. There is dispute about the exact founding date of MLB but the National 
League has been around since 1876 and the American League since 1901. History of the Game: 
Doubleday to Present Day, MLB.com, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/mlb_history_teams.jsp (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2013). The NFL traces its official origin to 1920. NFL, 2012 NFL Record & Fact Book 353–55, 
available at http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/history/pdfs/History/Chronology_2011.pdf. 
The NHL arrived in the United States in 1924, The History of the Hub of Hockey, Boston Bruins, 
http://bruins.nhl.com/club/page.htm?id=39032 (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). The American Professional 
Soccer League (progenitor of the MLS) originated in 1921. U.S. Soccer Timeline, U.S. Soccer, 
http://www.ussoccer.com/About/History/Timeline.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). The NBA is the 
rookie of the lot, harkening back less than sixty years to 1946. NBA Season Recaps, NBA.com, 
http://www.nba.us/history/seasonreviews/season-recaps/index.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
 145. See generally Fraser v. Major League Soccer, LLC, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002); N. Am. Soccer 
League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); N. Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 
1980); ChampionsWorld LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
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antitrust scrutiny and, therefore, predictably attractive to private plaintiff 
antitrust claims.146 
Of the entities examined here, the NCAA is least likely to be 
considered a single entity. As the Supreme Court itself has noted, the 
“core” activity of schools that participate under the NCAA umbrella is 
not the production of college sporting events, but the production of 
education.147 Therefore, in a broad sense, the NCAA is most aptly 
described as an independent accreditation program for those involved in 
college sports—much like the American Bar Association provides an 
accreditation program for university law schools.148 It should therefore be 
expected that when the NCAA stands in as a de facto players union that 
protects the amateur nature of the game and athletes, and thereby 
protects the educational goals of the colleges, the NCAA is at its most 
impervious to antitrust scrutiny. This is exactly what the data show: of the 
thirty-one claims levied against the NCAA, twenty touched upon player or 
personnel limitations.149 Of those twenty, courts overwhelmingly held that 
in the arena of setting athlete eligibility standards, the NCAA is acting 
“outside the scope” of antitrust law and is therefore not subject to antitrust 
review.150 The NCAA is at its weakest legally when it attempts to assist the 
flow of sports telecast revenues to universities by controlling the output of 
televised games.151 
 
 146. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 190 (2010). 
 147. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 121–22 (1984). 
 148. Compare ABA, The Law School Accreditation Process (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_revised_accredit
ation_brochure_web.authcheckdam.pdf, with About the NCAA: Membership, NCAA (Aug. 13, 2012), 
available at http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/membership+new. The 
NCAA is purely a voluntary organization that is not “necessary” for fielding a sports program—
although the absence of membership would be a de facto limitation on competitive opportunity. In 
some states (although not California) ABA accreditation is required to sit for the state bar exam 
making ABA accreditation a de facto requirement for any would-be law school. 
 149. See, e.g., Agnew, 683 F.3d 328; Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); Hennessey v. 
NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).  
 150. See Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding NCAA’s recruitment 
provisions not commercial and therefore outside reach of antitrust); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 
460, 497 (D.N.J. 1998) (“Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s promulgation of eligibility 
requirements.”); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding NCAA eligibility 
rules not subject to antitrust analysis). 
 151. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85. To put it in perspective, imagine Harvard Law School’s 
reaction if the ABA attempted to control the number of conferences Harvard could broadcast because 
the ABA wanted to ensure that Harvard did not crowd out revenue opportunities for Yale Law 
School and other ABA accredited schools. Note, however, that college sports conferences are more 
unassailable in this regard than is the NCAA. College sports conferences are organized by universities 
themselves to raise interest in their sports programs and attract broadcast revenues. 
K - Boliek_15 (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:35 PM 
528 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:501 
 
Conversely, MLS is highly centralized compared to other leagues.152 
But even given the high concentration of the soccer league, the single 
entity defense has proved tricky. The only court to address it found that 
the single-entity claim was weak, but the case was decided on other 
grounds.153 
Most antitrust claims against the entities studied overwhelmingly 
involve personnel (player) restraints. The next category involves 
ownership restraints such as relocation rights, expansion teams, or 
ownership limitations by status.154 Broadcast rights cases represent a 
relatively small share of cases but the highest potential revenue streams.155 
In percentage terms, approximately 56% percent of claims fall into the 
category of personnel (player) issues, 21% relate to ownership, and 22% 
are in the general pool comprised primarily of broadcast disputes and 
other contractual claims.156 
 
Figure 1: Sherman Act Claims by Category 
 
 152. Arguably, MLS was structured specifically to avoid antitrust scrutiny. See Fraser v. Major 
League Soccer, LLC, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132 (D. Mass. 2000); see also Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 
LLC, 284 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2002) (describing MLS’s “unique structure” in which MLS “owns all of 
the teams” and exerts “significant centralized control over both league and individual team 
operations”). 
 153. Id. at 59–60, 71 (finding no violation of the Sherman Act given the jury finding that there was 
no relevant market for player services). 
 154. See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Piazza v. MLB, 831 F. 
Supp. 420 (E.D. Penn. 1993); S.F. Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
 155. In Bd. of Regents, for example, both ABC and CBS had agreed to pay a minimum of $131.75 
million each to participating schools over a four-year period. 468 U.S. at 92–93; see Laumann v. NHL, 
907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). In 2011, MLB charged $200 per subscriber for their “Extra 
Innings” package through DirecTV and Dish Network and between $99.99 and $119.99 for Internet 
subscriptions to MLB.TV. Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 77, 88, Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (No. 12-
3704), 2012 WL 1609215. 
 156. See, e.g., Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (broadcasting 
rights); Baum Research & Dev. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Mich. 1998) 
(baseball bat standards). 
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Looking specifically at the use of single entity defense, the defense 
has been raised relatively few times and has succeeded even less 
frequently.157 Rather than the single entity defense, what stands as a true 
bar to antitrust scrutiny are the non-statutory labor exemptions which 
excluded approximately 7% of the cases in the entire dataset and 12% 
percent in the league-only dataset (excluding the NCAA). Likewise, the 
non-statutory baseball exemption excluded 7% of cases in the entire 
dataset and 12% percent in the league-only dataset. As one would 
expect, the 11% of cases found outside the purview of antitrust because 
the activity was “non-commercial” were claims against the NCAA. The 






Figure 2: Sherman Act Judicial Decisions 
 
 157. Because the single entity issue is at focus, the most expansive interpretation of the courts’ 
analyses was recorded. Arguably, of the two cases listed as “success” on single entity, there is potential 
controversy that the courts’ holdings (not dicta) relied merely on finding a “joint venture” core activity 
at issue, not a true single entity unassailable on all fronts. See Chi. Prof’l. Sports, 95 F.3d at 599–600; 
Fraser, 284 F.3d at 58. Also, only the final determination was included for analysis—lower or 
overturned opinions are not considered. See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship, 95 F.3d 593. 
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For all its critics, the joint venture jurisprudence of sports leagues 
has been sufficiently rigorous to recognize that antitrust applies and must 
be considered. Baseball is the notable exception because the court took a 
rocky first step and excluded much of baseball’s commercial activity from 
antitrust review.158 Although the Court has never remedied this, it has 
also never extended the standard to other professional leagues. 
What should be immediately evident from Figure 2 is that courts 
historically give little weight to the single entity defense and that American 
Needle is therefore not likely to change sports law in a meaningful way.159 
If, however, the baseball exemption were to fall by the judicial wayside, or 
if the non-statutory labor exemption were somehow curtailed, then there 
would be a potentially significant rise in antitrust action.160 
III.  Antitrust Analysis and Regulatory Policy Intertwined: 
Three Examples 
 Two of the most common antitrust challenges to sports telecasts 
can be broadly categorized as follows: (1) the overarching claim that the 
telecast contract restricts overall output;161 and (2) the telecaster is using 
 
 158. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
The judicial baseball exemption has been eroded in part by statute. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, 
15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006). 
 159. See supra Figure 2. 
 160. This is merely an empirical observation, not an argument for either position. Much has been 
written, however, on the desirability of removing the baseball exemption to place baseball on equal 
antitrust footing with other professional leagues. See, e.g., Morgen A. Sullivan, Note, “A Derelict in the 
Stream of the Law”: Overruling Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 48 Duke L.J. 1265 (1999). The 
creation of such judicial parity is consistent with this Article’s conclusion that the SBA should be 
abolished in the name of antitrust parity among comparably situated entities. See infra Part V.A. 
 161. As almost a corollary to this claim, a charge is often levied that the league alone or the league 
with the telecaster is using telecast contracts to fix prices. Such a claim of “multi-level” conspiracy is 
not analyzed here except to note its possible existence. To antitrust enthusiasts, an example of such a 
conspiracy was found in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000), where the purchaser 
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exclusive distributorships to attempt to monopolize the market or at least 
to reduce the vigor of competition. Many of these allegations overlap and 
can be brought in the same complaint. On the regulatory front, the 
concerns usually focus on the promotion of local, free, over-the-air 
broadcasts that may negate or curb the impact of an otherwise unrestricted 
antitrust analysis.162 The Subpart below discusses select sports telecast 
cases to elucidate the instances where antitrust and regulatory policy is 
most commonly in tension. 
A. Restraints on Output—NFL I and CHICAGO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 
As stated earlier, it is common practice among leagues to regulate 
team broadcast rights.163 Although each league has different rules, the 
home team is generally permitted to retain the rights to license its own 
games within its designated home territory and to assign the rights to its 
out-of-market games to a single seller. The argument follows that, but for 
this prohibition, “rival [teams] would compete with one another and 
offer their out-of-market game broadcasts to consumers, placing 
downward pressure on the price of the [centralized package] and result 
in increased output and [greater] competitive choice for consumers.”164 In 
other words, fans would not be presumptively aligned with their “local” 
team of the moment. Each team, regardless of geography, would be free 
to compete for the hearts and minds of every fan, in every location across 
the nation: a true “nationalization” of local sports.165 
It is certainly a compelling claim that in this brave new world of 
almost limitless transmission potential, league blackout rules are a bald, 
anticompetitive restriction by which individual teams can avoid intra-
league competition and protect their respective local broadcast 
 
(Toys ‘R Us) used its influence to coerce toy manufacturers to dramatically reduce their respective 
supply relationships with discounters. Id. at 931–32. Because the toy manufacturers were aware that 
Toys ‘R Us had asked all its suppliers to comply with this practice, they were held to be in a horizontal, 
price fixing conspiracy with each other as well as a vertical conspiracy with Toys ‘R Us. Id. at 935–36. 
 162. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (reaffirming that Congress’ interest 
in preserving benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television was an important government 
interest for First Amendment purposes); Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1193 (S.D. Cal. 
2002); Owen M. Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1215, 1226 (1999). 
 163. See supra Part I.A. 
 164. Kingray, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. 
 165. In Laumann v. NHL, MSG Network and the New York Rangers argued that “[i]n a fully 
competitive marketplace, the [individual clubs] could and would . . . increas[e] the opportunity to view 
[their] games throughout the country, whether through cable, satellite or on the internet.” Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaints at 24–25, 
Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-1817), 2012 WL 5272340. As courts 
have recognized, “a horizontal agreement that allocates a market between competitors and restricts 
each company’s ability to compete for the other’s business may injure competition.” Brantley v. NBC 
Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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revenues.166 This classic geographic market division violates section 1.167 It 
is not a claim that a court has yet decided upon as the stringent plaintiff 
standing requirements have not been established in most cases.168 
Moreover, even if standing were properly established, there is arguably 
regulatory complicity that would affect, and perhaps deter, any antitrust 
remedy. This seems, at least, to be problematic public policy as the 
leagues are hardly in a position of precarious financial viability.169 In 
addition, given the extensive tax revenues provided to bolster stadium 
expenditures, it is questionable whether taxpayers (sports consumers) 
should also provide regulatory cover for potential anticompetitive 
restraints, thereby paying the price but not reaping the benefit. The FCC 
itself is concerned that its policy is outdated and the agency is in the 
process of considering removing the sports broadcast rules or adapting 
them to reflect the vibrancy of today’s sports markets.170 
1. NFL I 
Consider again the case presented in NFL I that examined the 
legality of a version of the NFL’s blackout rules.171 The NFL’s rules 
prohibited its member teams from broadcasting their own games to 
 
 166. It is tempting to so argue, but it is not facially evident. There are strong efficiency arguments 
for some type of limiting and regulating mechanism for determining each team’s property rights. 
Because each game involves two teams at a minimum, rights vis-à-vis these two teams must be 
rationalized for an efficient market in property rights to exist. 
 167. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). 
 168. See Kingray, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1179; see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. 
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983) (arguing that “the judicial remedy” for an 
antitrust violation “cannot encompass every conceivable harm that can be traced to alleged 
wrongdoing”); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977) (“[A]ntitrust laws will be more 
effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers 
rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for the 
amount it could show was absorbed by it.”). 
 169. The average NFL team is now worth $1.1 billion and the NFL is set to receive $6 billion annually 
in television revenue alone. Mike Ozanian, Dallas Cowboys Lead NFL with $2.1 Billion Valuation, 
Forbes.com (Sept. 5, 2012, 8:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2012/09/05/dallas-
cowboys-lead-nfl-with-2-1-billion-valuation. The average NBA team has increased in value by thirty 
percent to $509 million, and league wide revenues are expected to top $5 billion in 2013. Kurt 
Badenhausen, Billion-Dollar Knicks and Lakers Top List of NBA’s Most Valuable Teams, Forbes 
(Jan. 23, 2013, 11:56 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/01/23/billion-dollar-knicks-
and-lakers-top-list-of-nbas-most-valuable-teams. The average NHL team is worth $282 million, an 
eighteen percent increase, however half of the teams are operating in the red; nevertheless, the overall 
revenue for the league hit $3.4 billion for the 201112 season. Mike Ozanian, NHL Teams Values 2012: 
Toronto Maple Leafs are First Hockey Team Worth $1 Billion, Forbes (Nov. 28, 2012, 11:52 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2012/11/28/nhl-team-values-2012-maple-leafs-first-hockey-team-
worth-1-billion. 
 170. See Statement of McDowell, supra note 75. 
 171. United States v. NFL (NFL I), 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953), superseded by statute, Sports 
Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, § 1, 75 Stat. 732, as recognized in Shaw v. Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 1999) 
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networks in markets other than its own on days when a team from the 
target market was either playing at home, or broadcasting its away game 
in that market.172 In NFL I, the court employed a rule of reason analysis 
and determined that the prohibition on selling broadcast rights into 
another team’s home market when that other team was playing at home 
was a valid restriction on broadcast rights.173 However, the court also 
decided that the NFL overreached when it attempted to restrict the sale 
of rights into another market when there was not another team 
physically playing within that market.174 
The court’s analysis permitted one justification for the restriction: 
an explanation of how the restriction optimized the objective of the joint 
venture—the promotion of professional football.175 The justification the 
NFL gave was that a home team’s gate receipts would be jeopardized by 
the intrusion of the broadcast of a competitor’s game.176 The NFL feared 
 
 172. Although all leagues regulate their broadcast rights distinctly, some leagues (for example the 
NBA, NHL, and MLB) assign each member club a “home territory,” which impacts where the league’s 
blackouts occur. The teams have two territorial privileges: (1) a team can sell the broadcast license to its 
games; and (2) a team controls its home territory where it plays. The NFL is distinct among leagues as all 
its games are sold as national packages. That said, even in the NFL several Sunday games are localized 
and only televised in the home territories of the two teams playing against each other. 
 173. NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 325–26; see Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). It is possible that the court in Laumann, a post-American Needle case, relies on NFL I in error. 
The Laumann court concluded rather boldly that “the notion that ‘the exhibition of league games on 
television and the Internet’ is clearly a ‘league issue’ is contrary to longstanding precedent that 
agreements limiting the telecasting of professional sports games are subject to antitrust scrutiny, and 
analyzed under the rule of reason.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing NFL I as supporting precedent). 
To the extent the court came to this conclusion because the particular procedural posture (a 
motion to dismiss) had not yet permitted sufficient discovery to conduct a rule of reason analysis on 
the merits, the dicta is understandable. However, to the extent the court states that telecast cannot be 
a core activity on the merits, perhaps as a “quick look” rule of reason analysis (step one of the two-
step analysis) the ruling is simply incorrect. Judge Scheindlin relied heavily on two cases: NFL I and 
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma. Id. at 488 n.134. Reliance on NFL I to 
determine the merits of Laumann short circuits the review of the changed economic realities in league 
finance. NFL I was decided in an era before the national telecast market was fully developed; a time 
when gate receipts were relatively more important than broadcast revenue in securing intra-league 
competitive parity. There is a strong argument that NFL I itself would be decided differently today 
given the heightened importance of broadcast revenue versus gate receipts. 
Likewise, Judge Scheindlin’s reliance on Board of Regents is misplaced. In that case, the NCAA 
was attempting to smooth broadcast revenues among all teams in part by limiting the telecast output 
of the most popular programs. 468 U.S. at 109. Unlike professional leagues, the NCAA is a joint 
venture without profit-maximizing “core” goals and its protection of college sports’ revenue streams is 
arguably not analogous to the parallel concerns of pro sports leagues for its club members. See id. at 
121 (White, J., dissenting). 
 174. NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 326–27. It is important to note that the telecaster is also a potential 
defendant under similar fact patterns. See Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 474–75 (alleging that the 
distributer DirecTV and co-defendant NHL restrained output by an agreement to prevent the airing 
of an NHL game simultaneously on local television and on DirectTV’s “NHL Center Ice”). 
 175. NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 326. 
 176. Id. at 325. 
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that fans would prefer to watch any game on television—even though not 
“their” team’s game—rather than brave the expense and inconvenience 
of going to the stadium.177 Rather than give fans the choice, the owners 
collectively agreed not to televise a game into any market with live play 
to increase ticket sales.178 
Given the “economic reality” of the day—that the majority of a 
team’s profit was derived from gate receipts—the split in the court’s 
decision (restriction when the home team is playing allowed, and the 
restriction when no one is playing disallowed) is internally consistent.179 
Another holding might jeopardize the revenue of a less popular but local 
team that in turn might lead to further erosion of that team’s competitive 
prowess vis-à-vis the rest of the league.180 This is in large part due to the 
fact that the NFL splits its telecast revenues evenly across the league to 
support competitive parity and preserve the intensity of the sport—the 
central object of the joint venture.181 This is not, however, true across 
leagues and may be a boundary that is determinative of antitrust 
outcomes.182 
Because NFL I was problematic for the NFL, they lobbied for and 
received a special exemption from antitrust law for pooled broadcast 
rights.183 The legislation enacted is not only a tribute to special interests; it 
is the poster child for why such legislation is problematic. The SBA creates 
disparity in antitrust treatment in not one, but two major markets.184 It 
carves out protection only for the NFL, NHL, NBA, and MLB and only 
when contracting with broadcasters (not cable or satellite).185 A contract 
by any of these leagues that sells pooled rights to a broadcaster will be 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 326. 
 180. This is, of course, ultimately an empirical question. 
 181. See John Vrooman, The Economic Structure of the NFL, in The Economics of The National 
Football League 7, 10 (Kevin G. Quinn ed., 2012); Matthew Futterman et al., NFL: The League that 
Runs TV, Wall St. J. (Dec. 15, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970204026804577098774037075832.html. 
 182. For example in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, Judge Easterbrook gave 
great weight to the fact that the league (1) did not pool all its broadcast rights but permitted individual 
contracting and (2) to the extent individual contracts siphoned funds from the NBA, the NBA could 
recoup some funds by “taxing” the individual team and dividing those funds to financially troubled 
teams. 961 F.2d 667, 671, 675–76 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 183. Michael McCann, Seven Years In, NFL Network Still Battling Cable Companies, Sports 
Illustrated (May 27, 2010, 10:40 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael_mccann/ 
05/26/nfl/index.html. 
 184. See supra Part III.A.1–2. 
 185. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). See Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys 
Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding subscription satellite to not fit the 
sponsored telecast exemption of the SBA); Chi. Prof’l Sports, 808 F. Supp. at 650 (finding that cable 
television broadcasting was not sponsored telecasting within the SBA exemption). 
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excluded from antitrust review.186 This raises the question of whether the 
SBA itself causes anticompetitive disruptions in either or both of the 
protected markets. 
As noted, if brought today, NFL I would be barred from antitrust 
review by the SBA. As regrettable as this may be, as described in 
Part IV, the SBA excludes very few cases in today’s telecast market.187 
Nonetheless, for reasons of sound policy and general parity among sports 
leagues and telecasters alike, it would be best to abolish the SBA in its 
entirety and let antitrust take us where it will.188 
2. The FCC’s Sports Blackout Rules 
The potential for the type of national, intra-league competition 
envisioned by NFL I is more than mere conjecture. In the world of 
Internet, digital cable, and satellite transmission, the ability to provide 
consumers a multitude of channels is both technically and economically 
feasible in a way that the free, over-the-air broadcasters of the past never 
were.189 Technically, the regional networks and superstations can reach 
into the home broadcast zone of a different team and put pressure on the 
league’s blackout policies for satellite and cable programs. However, the 
FCC rules support the contractual, geographic limitations imposed on 
telecasters by the league itself.190 In the simplest terms, the FCC’s sports 
blackout rules permit leagues to use their blackout policies for local 
television channels that are available for carriage in the same television 
market by cable and satellite systems.191 
3. Chicago Professional Sports 
Compared to American Needle, Chicago Professional Sports was a 
photo finish. Unlike the intellectual property of team insignias—which 
 
 186. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 187. See infra Part IV. 
 188. See infra Part V. 
 189. For example, in the pre-digital world, over-the-air broadcasters broadcast on one channel 
only. Today a “network” such as the MLB network, may occupy several channels, such that 
simultaneous broadcast (and viewing) of conflicting games is imminently possible. 
 190. It should be noted that in the entertainment industry it is common practice to grant exclusive 
rights to broadcasters based on geography—this is true for all programming, even for non-sports 
programs. Charles Goldfarb, Cong. Research Serv., RL33034, Telecommunications Act: 
Competition, Innovation, and Reform 41 (2006). Thus, in some situations where the regulatory 
framework allows satellite (or cable) operators to retransmit the signals of a distant (non-local) 
broadcast station, subject to obtaining the permission of the broadcast station, that station may be—
and in practice often is—contractually prohibited from granting the multichannel video programming 
distributor (“MVPD”) retransmission rights. 
 191. The regulatory process by which this is accomplished is by a complex implementation of the 
FCC’s non-duplication and ex-syndication rules that were established to protect local broadcast 
revenues. See discussion supra note 64. 
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by definition highlight a single team—at issue in Chicago Professional 
Sports was the intellectual property of game broadcasts that always 
include at least two potential rights holders.192 Not only is the NBA 
concerned in regulating the property rights among its team members, it 
also has an independent interest in maximizing the revenue of the NBA 
as a whole.193 This last interest is justified to the extent that revenues 
assist competitive balance in the league.194 In Chicago Professional 
Sports, the very popular Bulls made an independent contract for the 
broadcast of its games with superstation WGN.195 This contract 
threatened to diminish revenue from the pooled broadcast rights sold by 
the NBA.196 The court noted that although the pooling of rights for the 
NBA broadcasting contract was acceptable, competition for individual 
contracts was also possible, and the court rejected the charge that the 
Bulls were free riding on the NBA and thereby harming competition.197 
In particular, the court noted approvingly that intra-league competition 
could be preserved by an NBA “tax” on individual team contracts.198 
As fascinating as the antitrust issues in this case are, so too are the 
regulatory issues. Superstations are independent broadcast television 
stations whose broadcast signals are picked up and redistributed by 
satellite to local cable television operators and to satellite television 
operators all across the United States.199 The superstation with which the 
Bulls contracted is one of six such stations in the country.200 In this 
regard, a superstation is more akin to a “network” than a local 
broadcaster and because of this, these stations receive special regulatory 
consideration.201 Specifically, satellite operators are required to permit a 
 
 192. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 193. See id. at 672; see also John Lombardo, Inside NBA’s Revenue Sharing, SportsBusinessDaily 
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/01/23/Leagues-and-
Governing-Bodies/NBA-revenue.aspx; Patrick Rishe, Savvy and Shrewd Summarize Stern’s 
Leadership Legacy as NBA Commissioner, Forbes (Oct. 25, 2012, 7:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/prishe/2012/10/25/savvy-and-shrewd-summarize-sterns-leadership-legacy-as-nba-commissioner. 
 194. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117–18 (1984). 
 195. Chi. Prof’l Sports, 961 F.2d at 669. 
 196. Id. at 675. 
 197. Id. at 675–76. 
 198. Id. at 671. Not greatly explored in this case is the importance of inter-league branding by the 
NBA. Although courts have underappreciated the importance of branding, it may become increasingly 
relevant in the context of entertainment telecasts. 
 199. This process is governed by the Satellite Home Viewer Act and the 1992 Cable Act. See 
discussion supra notes 69, 59. 
 200. The six superstations are WWOR and WPIX, New York; WSBK, Boston; WGN, Chicago; 
KTLA, Los Angeles; and KWGN, Denver. FCC, Fact Sheet: Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act 
of 1999, FCC (2000), http://transition.fcc.gov/mb/shva/shviafac.html. 
 201. 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2006); Press Release, FCC, Commission Implements Satellite Home Viewer 
Improvement Act Sports Blackout and Program Exclusivity Rule Provisions for Satellite Carriers 
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local broadcaster to safeguard their specific distribution rights for 
syndicated programming and network programming “against duplicating 
programming carried on a nationally distributed superstation by a 
satellite carrier.”202 The crucial takeaway is that most households that can 
receive the signals of local broadcast stations—whether over-the-air or as 
a local-into-local satellite service—are legally ineligible to receive distant 
network signals (such as from a superstation). 
Some of the many competing regulatory goals in the 
telecommunications industry support localism, the preservation of free 
over-the-air broadcast television, and the attempt to balance the interests 
of the satellite, cable, and broadcast industries.203 In this regard, the 
prohibition on the retransmissions of distant signals, coupled with the 
mandatory carriage of local signals, is a perfect example of the structural 
engineering used by the FCC to protect “localism.”204 The Commission 
hopes that a station located in a particular area will, by extension, be most 
likely to promote local interests. Regardless of the actual effectiveness of 
that strategy, the prohibition on distant signals is the rule of the day.205 
Therefore, even after the antitrust analysis finds that NBA broadcast 
restrictions on the club member are anticompetitive, a Bull’s fan in 
Florida may still be unable to receive the superstation’s signals due to the 
regulatory preferences given to local broadcasters over out-of-market 
superstations. What antitrust giveth, regulation taketh away. 
B. Exclusive Distributorship and Network Joint Ventures 
Perhaps the contractual device most troubling to telecommunications 
policy watchers is the use of exclusive distributorships. An exclusive 
distributorship is the contractual agreement of one entity to buy (or sell) 
only to another.206 The key concern with vertical restraints—either by 
contractual exclusivity, joint ownership or, in the extreme, vertical 
merger207—is the thought that such restraints lead to foreclosure of rivals 
 
(Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Press Release], available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/ 
News_Releases/2000/nrcb0024.txt. 
 202. Press Release, supra note 201. 
 203. See supra Part I. 
 204. See Background on Localism in Broadcasting, FCC, http://transition.fcc.gov/ownership/ 
materials/newly-released/localismbroadcasting.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
 205. The effect of many of these rules, including the mandatory carriage rules, is to provide 
increased bargaining power to the local broadcaster vis-à-vis the cable and satellite transmitter. 
 206. See Black’s Law Dictionary 544 (9th ed. 2009). 
 207. Vertical mergers are analyzed under the Clayton Act § 3 (an incipiency statute) as well as 
under the Sherman Act § 1 in the non-merger context. Analysis of the two is virtually 
indistinguishable. Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (2d ed. 1993). 
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from an essential input (or output), and that the harm to rivals—increases 
in input costs—in turn leads to reduced competition.208 
Consider once again our lamenting fan. This time our fan is annoyed 
because she is a Laker fan and a Cox Communications cable customer. 
The Lakers signed an exclusive deal with Time Warner Cable and she will 
not have access to the games unless Cox purchases the new network from 
Time Warner (Cox’s competitor).209 Although understandably annoyed, 
there may be larger competitive issues at work than the foreclosure of 
access to Laker games.210 The exclusive deal may make Time Warner 
more competitive as against DirecTV, for example, a process by which 
even our disgruntled fan will eventually prosper. Indeed, DirecTV has 
arguably become a more viable substitute to cable due to the use of 
exclusive dealerships with the NFL.211 This process of competitive 
innovation in turn puts competitive pressure on cable operators to satisfy 
consumer demand, to keep prices low, and generate quality transmissions. 
In other words, it disciplines the cable operators to optimize consumer 
welfare by free market mechanisms rather than by regulation. 
To place our hypothetical in antitrust terms, if we assume for the 
moment that the sports entity that sells its telecast rights is a single 
entity,212 then the antitrust and regulatory concerns will focus on the 
levels of foreclosure in the telecast market. The key issue is whether the 
use of exclusive rights facilitates the accruement or exploitation of 
monopoly power.213 However, because exclusive distributorships may 
have myriad pro-competitive rationales, the courts most often uphold 
them under antitrust scrutiny.214 
 
 208. See Paul H. Brietzke, Antitrust Paradox, 13 Val. U. L. Rev. 403 (1979) (reviewing Robert Bork, 
The Antitrust Paradox (2d ed. 1993)). “There are of course other concerns such as strategic control of 
inputs in an oligopoly market, potential ability to price discriminate and foreclosure that creates entry 
barriers.” Id.; see Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy 421–24 (4th ed. 2011). 
 209. Time Warner Cable Signs First Major Lakers Deal, NBA.com (Oct. 27, 2012 5:58 PM), 
http://www.nba.com/2012/news/10/26/time-warner-cable-lakers.ap/index.html. 
 210. Consider the impact the NFL and DirecTV deal has on customer demand for Comcast, for 
example. 
 211. See Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, 27 FCC Rcd. 8776 (2012) [hereinafter Status of Competition], available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-13-99A1.pdf (citing various statistics on the 
development of DBS penetration rates versus cable). 
 212. American Needle itself could have selected Reebok to be the focus of its claim rather than the 
NFL. After all, American Needle’s problems revolved around the exclusive deal involving its rival, 
Reebok. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 187 (2010). 
 213. See, e.g., Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc., 
26 FCC Rcd. 4238, 4253 (2011) (noting that “vertical integration of certain video program networks 
[including RSNs] with a particular MVPD [c]ould harm MVPD competition and enhance the 
integrated MVPD’s market power”). 
 214. For example, exclusive distributorships can guarantee supply chains, prevent promotional free 
riding, and promote inter-brand competition. Judge Easterbrook noted these possible benefits in 
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But if antitrust scrutinizes the exclusive distributorship and still 
upholds the restraint, should the regulator nonetheless enter to supervise 
exclusive arrangements and engineer desired outcomes? Historically, the 
answer has been “yes”—sometimes.215 Congress and the FCC have shown 
concern for developing markets in telecommunications over and above 
that of antitrust “referees.”216 In an example of the type of protection 
afforded nascent technology, Congress granted great protection to direct 
broadcast services (“DBS”) as against cable operators when it comes to 
the treatment of programming—sports programming in particular.217 
Specifically, in the 1992 Cable Act, Congress demanded that cable 
operators be compelled to: (1) sell any cable-affiliated programming to 
DBS and other cable operators in the area, and (2) sell such 
programming at “reasonable” rates.218 Except under the most extreme of 
cases, antitrust law cannot compel a company to sell to a competitor.219 
The intent of this provision was to insure that cable operators did not use 
exclusive distributorships to “lock-up” must-have content and thereby 
 
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA when he asked the following question: “Is the 
NBA instead a joint venture adopting strategies that foster its competition with other entertainments? 
In that event pro basketball on TV is not fundamentally different from Star Trek: The Next 
Generation, a series created by cooperation among many persons who are competitors at other times. 
Producers of a television series commit the episodes exclusively to one network (or one station in a 
local market) in order to compete against the offerings of other ventures. No program, indeed no 
producer’s entire menu of programs, commands a substantial share of the market in televised 
entertainment. Marketing strategies such as exclusivity and limits on the number of episodes produced 
per year then must be understood as ways to compete rather than ways to exploit consumers.” 
961 F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chi. Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 44, 47 
(7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a licensing contract of the New York Times to the Chicago Tribune). 
 215. The recent Comcast-NBC merger agreement revealed an interesting example of the different 
goals of the FCC and FTC. Although both approved the merger and issued consent decrees, the FCC 
added several programming requirements, including educational and Spanish language programming 
as well as programming of interest to the local community. United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-
0106, 2011 WL 5402137 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2011). 
 216. It is not only concern for the development of nascent technologies that may motivate the 
regulator to intervene. In addition, some scholars argue that information services are unique because 
of the content they carry—and therefore merit heightened scrutiny. For example, Tim Wu argues that 
vertical restraints that combine content creators with content transmissions are particularly 
problematic. Wu, supra note 2, at 164. This is consistent in part with the FCC’s attitude toward 
RSNs—the opportunity for foreclosure is important to competition but, in this market, it also 
forecloses a potential outlet for democratic expression. In response, Wu advocates for extensive 
regulatory intervention to address “the corrupting effects of vertically integrated power” in the 
information sectors. Wu, supra note 2, at 307. 
 217. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 
106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).  
 218. Id. 
 219. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414–16 
(2004) (reasoning that judges cannot compel interconnection under antitrust laws); Aspen Skiing Co. 
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985) (noting the general rule is that a company 
may unilaterally refuse to deal with any competitor.). 
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render the growing DBS competition unattractive.220 The rules, subject to 
a sunset provision, were renewed twice even though the DBS market had 
developed leaps and bounds in the decades since the law was first 
enacted.221 Scheduled to sunset by statute in 2012, the FCC allowed the 
rules to run their course—except for RSNs, for which the FCC extended 
the rules.222 
Moreover, in addition to RSNs, the sunset order included a new 
Notice of Inquiry asking commentators to recommend other programs or 
networks that may also lead to problematic use of market power.223 The 
continued concern of anticompetitive behavior with exclusive contracts is 
revealed in the trepidations expressed by Senate Commerce Committee 
Chairman John Rockefeller who fears that the FCC’s new complaint 
process against cable companies that lock up programming may not be 
enough.224 He warns that “if [the FCC’s] process does not deter 
anticompetitive behavior that harms consumers, Congress will need to 
consider whether it should restore appropriate safeguards.”225 
The words of Senator Rockefeller acknowledge that exclusive deals, 
even if often pro-consumer, have their legal limits—both in antitrust and 
in regulation. To the extent we look at such exclusive distributorships as 
pro-consumer—perhaps welfare enhancing to all telecast consumers, not 
just sports content consumers—the next question is what are the antitrust 
and regulatory limits on such relationships.226 The following Subpart 
discusses two examples of common exclusive distributorships: the sale of 
league rights to RSNs and the NFL’s sale of rights to DirecTV for NFL 
Sunday Ticket. 
 
 220. 138 Cong. Rec. S16979-02 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Senator DeConcini). 
 221. Industry History, SBCA, http://www.sbca.com/receiver-network/history-satellite-
providers.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
 222. Revision of Program Access Rules, supra note 5, at 66026-27. 
 223. Id. at 66052-54; see also Seth A. Davidson & Arthur H. Harding, FCC Allows Prohibition on 
Exclusive Contracts to Sunset and Makes Changes to Program Access Procedural Rules; Seeks 
Comments on Additional Revisions to Program Access Rules, Martindale.com (Oct. 10, 2012), 
http://www.martindale.com/communications-media/article_Edwards-Wildman-Palmer-
LLP_1603282.htm. 
 224. Press Release, Democratic Press Office, Rockefeller on FCC Action to Sunset Program Access 
Rules (Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases& 
ContentRecord_id=1950c17a-f000-4337-854e-74e293bb4523&ContentType_id=77eb43da-aa94-497d-a73f-
5c951ff72372&Group_id=4b968841-f3e8-49da-a529-7b18e32fd69d&YearDisplay=2012. 
 225. Id. 
 226. It is difficult to establish antitrust injury of indirect purchasers of the content. See Laumann v. 
NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding no antitrust injury to consumers of sports 
programming because it was too “difficult to identify and apportion in light of the packaged nature of 
television services”). 
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1. Regional Sports Networks 
The national discourse (at least on sports and telecast) has been 
preoccupied by the ever-escalating rates paid by networks to individual 
sports teams for exclusive rights or joint venture agreements to produce 
a sports network featuring that team.227 Such agreements embody both 
regulatory policy and antitrust concerns. First, as a matter of regulatory 
policy, control of a content provider by a cable operator might result in the 
cable operator refusing to sell the network to its competitors and thereby 
foreclose content access to DBS consumers—destabilizing regulatory, 
structural engineering. Traditional antitrust concern is similar, but not 
identical. For example, antitrust would be concerned if the cable operator 
foreclosed access to competitors entirely in an attempt to monopolize the 
market. Alternatively, concerns would arise if the competitor sold the 
network to competitors at highly elevated rates to either (1) effectively 
foreclose the market or (2) raise rivals’ costs to make them less attractive 
to consumers.228 
In general, RSNs are networks (often comprised of several channels) 
dedicated to sports teams in a particular region.229 In a nutshell, sports 
telecast contracts assign or license content rights of a team or league (1) to 
a network operator (such as ESPN) who in turn markets the product to a 
distributor (such as Comcast or Time Warner), (2) to a broadcaster (such 
as Fox or NBC) who both produces and distributes the content, or (3) to 
distributors (such as Comcast or Time Warner) who produce and 
distribute a network and sell it to other distributors. Different regulatory 
provisions and antitrust concerns are implicated depending on the 
particular entity that sells the rights and the specific platform used to 
distribute the content.230 
 
 227. Time Warner agreed to pay an average of $150 million per season for twenty seasons to 
broadcast the Lakers. Joe Flint, DirecTV Reaches Deal with Time Warner Cable for Lakers Channel, 
L.A. Times (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/15/entertainment/la-et-ct-
lakers-directv-20121115. 
 228. The Regional Sports Network Marketplace, 27 FCC Rcd. 154, 155 (Jan. 6, 2012), available at 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-12-18A1_Rcd.pdf (expressing concern over joint 
ownership of content and distribution for RSNs as it may facilitate (1) the “temporary or permanent 
withholding of programming” and (2) a “‘stealth discrimination’ strategy, raising the price of affiliated 
RSNs for rival MVPDs in a discriminatory manner.”). 
 229. See, e.g., Daniel L. Brenner et al., Cable Television and Other Nonbroadcast Video 
§ 6:142.50 (2013); Richard Sandomir, Regional Sports Networks Show the Money, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/sports/regional-sports-networks-show-teams-
the-money.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 230. Interestingly, there are contractual limitations that restrict the ability of vertically integrated 
firms to show content slated for one division on another national outlet. For example, Fox has both a 
cable network and a broadcast network. William Launder, Does Fox Dream of an ESPN?, Wall 
Street J. (Dec. 16, 2012, 7:34 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424127887324677204578183260129173592.html. 
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RSNs have a multitude of different ownership structures.231 Some are 
contractual, exclusive deals in the form previously discussed. However, 
others are true joint ventures with ownership stakes shared between the 
network producer (such as ESPN, MSG, and Time Warner Cable) and the 
content provider (the teams).232 As noted, if the RSN is a cable-affiliated 
program (and only a cable-affiliated program) that network will, by law, be 
made available to competing distributors.233 Negotiations are mandated, 
but the ultimate price is in part a matter of private contract. That said, the 
purchaser may ultimately fall upon the FCC as arbiter of the “reasonable 
price” mandated by law.234 
2. NFL Sunday Ticket 
An example of a popular and yet often maligned exclusive deal is 
DirecTV’s NFL Sunday Ticket.235 Since its inception in 1994, the Sunday 
Ticket is an exclusive contract by which the NFL has sold DirecTV 
certain exclusive broadcast rights.236 The NFL Sunday Ticket is an out-of-
market sports package that features all of the NFL games carried by Fox 
and CBS.237 Instead of being restricted to the games being telecast by the 
local Fox and CBS affiliates, this package allows a viewer to watch any of 
the NFL Sunday games.238 The exclusive contract with DirecTV expired 
in 2002 and several cable companies offered large sums for nonexclusive 
 
The Fox broadcast network has rights to broadcast certain NFL games, as Fox develops its sports 
network it cannot simply start showing these games on the cable network; that involves a different 
bucket of contractual rights and may also implicate distinct regulatory and statutory provisions. Id. 
Likewise, if Fox has NBA games slated only for local broadcast on its regional sports network it could 
not display those games nationally or on another Fox regional sports network. Id. See, e.g., FOX 
Sports on MSN, http://msn.foxsports.com (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
 231. See Brenner et al., supra note 229, § 6:142.50; Diana Moss, Regional Sports Networks, 
Competition, and the Consumer, 21 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 56, 5659 (2008) (discussing regional 
sports networks and ownership structures). 
 232. This is exactly the type of relationship feared by Wu. See generally Wu, supra note 2. 
 233. See supra notes 227–230 and accompanying text. 
 234. 47 U.S.C. § 532(c) (2006). 
 235. See, e.g., Joe Flint, DirecTV’s Next Dilemma: Punting or Keeping Sunday Ticket Package, L.A. 
Times (May 10, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-
directv-nfl-sunday-ticket-20130509,0,1988730.story. 
 236. Mike Reynolds, NFL Scores with $4 Billion DirecTV Sunday Ticket Extension, 
Multichannel News (Mar. 23, 2009, 7:08 PM), http://www.multichannel.com/content/nfl-scores-4-
billion-directv-sunday-ticket-extension. 
 237. NFL Sunday Ticket, DirecTV, http://www.directv.com/sports/nfl?lpos=Header:3 (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2013). 
 238. Id. Note, however, that home games of a local market team will be blacked-out to even a 
DirectTV subscriber in accordance with league rules. What are the NFL Blackout Rules for My Home 
Team?, DirecTV, http://support.directv.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/484/related/1/session/ 
L2F2LzEvdGltZS8xMzYyNDY5MjA4L3NpZC9SeDJueW5rbAzEvdGltZS8xMzYyNDY5MjA4L3N
pZC9SeDJueW5rbA%3D%3D (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
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broadcast rights to the programming.239 However, the NFL rejected these 
bids and instead chose to renew with DirecTV, granting it a five-year 
exclusive rights deal at approximately the same rates offered for the 
nonexclusive rights.240 Why would the NFL give exclusive rights when it 
could make the same amount twice over by selling to cable? Is there 
anticompetitive conduct afoot?241 
As the contract is private, the reason for the NFL’s persistence in 
working with DirecTV is largely unexplained. If challenged under an 
antitrust suit, however, some of the justifications could be as follows. The 
NFL’s objective is to promote its brand as against all other entertainment 
sources, so as to widen its product market. The objective of cable or 
satellite providers is simply to attract more subscribers and they are 
indifferent as to which entertainment source attracts those customers. 
Thus, the NFL and video operator’s incentives are misaligned, and the 
NFL may need to compensate the operator for the brand promotion the 
NFL desires.242 Arguably, the NFL believes that its contract with 
DirecTV best assures that it is getting the promotion that it paid for; the 
exclusivity may guarantee that other comparable products (say from 
other leagues) do not receive the same promotional attentions. In this 
respect, exclusivity may be a way to prevent telecaster opportunism and 
to promote inter-brand competition among entertainment sources. 
DirecTV, under this argument, is not in a homogeneous market space 
with other cable and satellite operators; rather, DirecTV provides a 
differentiated product that is superior for the NFL’s goals. 
Unlike cable operators, DirecTV is under no obligation to sell rights 
to this programming. Again, this regulatory disparity reflects the 
distinctions in market maturity between cable and DBS, and the 
preference provided the latter. The disparity seems to have worked in 
developing the DBS market. In recent years, DirecTV has grown in 
penetration rates by leaps and bounds, and has positioned itself in the 
market as the place for sports.243 However, this concentration opens 
opportunities for competitors, rather than only diminishing 
opportunities. For example, with the rise in sports programming costs, 
 
 239. Cable companies offered a reported $400–500 million for nonexclusive rights. Richard 
Sandomir, Cable Plays Hardball with the N.F.L., N.Y. Times (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/11/14/sports/football/14sandomir.html. 
 240. The estimated price paid was about $400 million per year. Id. 
 241. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 (1985) 
 242. See generally Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1982); see also 
Benjamin Klein, Exclusive Dealing as Competition for Distribution “on the Merits”, 12 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 119, 139–40 (2003). 
 243. Alex Sherman, DirecTV Profit Rises 8.5% as U.S. Customer Growth Slows, Bloomberg 
(May 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-08/directv-earnings-exceed-estimates-on-pay-
tv-subscriber-growth.html. 
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non-sports viewers in particular are becoming increasingly disgruntled 
with rising costs.244 Dish has taken this as an opportunity to position itself 
as the lower cost alternative with fewer sports networks.245 
IV.  Policy Recommendations: Clear the Playing Field 
A. It’s Time to Make the Sports Broadcast Act Universal or 
Abolish the Sports Broadcast Act 
There is no doubt that the SBA was a triumph in special interest 
legislation. As such, the courts have narrowly interpreted the exemption 
it provides and have permitted extensive challenges around the edges of 
the terms.246 The exemption has been construed to mean exactly what it 
says—it excludes from antitrust review pooled negotiations of the MLB, 
NHL, NBA, and NFL for the transfer of exhibition rights to “supported 
telecasts,”—free, over-the-air broadcasters.247 In today’s world, that 
means that the exemption is essentially irrelevant as the vast majority of 
negotiations occur with pay services such as MVPD and DBS channels 
that are not exempted.248 Indeed, jointly negotiated contracts have been 
challenged a variety of times, most recently in Laumann v. NHL.249 
There are several policy implications spawned from the two-market 
disparity memorialized by the SBA. In the first market, roughly defined as 
professional league sports, there is disparity among expressly exempt and 
non-exempt leagues as to the treatment of their pooled broadcast rights. 
For example, MLS and NASCAR do not enjoy the same exemption.250 In 
 
 244. The cost of sports programming is largely borne by all the telecaster’s consumers. Distributors 
are increasingly pushing back on content providers by placing new networks in “sports tiers” (for 
cable) and in other premium spots so that the distributor can price discriminate between sports and 
non-sports viewers. Joe Flint & Meg James, Rising Sports Programming Costs Could Have Consumers 
Crying Foul, L.A. Times (Dec. 1, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/01/business/la-fi-1202-ct-
sports-cost-20121202. 
 245. Dish Network’s cheapest package is currently $49.99 per month. The sports channels included 
in this package are: ESPN, ESPN 2, ESPN News, ESPN U, HRTV, and TVG. American’s Top 120, 
DISH, http://www.dish.com/entertainment/packages/americas-top-120/?WT.svl=at120details-button 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
 246. See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Special interest 
laws do not have ‘spirits,’ and it is inappropriate to extend them to achieve more of the objective the 
lobbyists wanted.”); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 646–47 (1990); 
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. 
Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1986); In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 247. See Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 302–03 (3d Cir. 1999); Chi. 
Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 1996); U.S. Football League v. NFL, 634 F. 
Supp. 1155, 1164–65 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 248. Status of Competition, supra note 211, at 8672 (citing penetration rates). 
 249. 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 250. This is because NASCAR is not one of the narrowly defined leagues that are written into the 
SBA. 
K - Boliek_15 (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:35 PM 
February 2014]        NEW RULES OF SPORTS TELECASTS 545 
 
the second market, roughly defined as the market of telecast platforms, 
there is disparity between over-the-air, free networks and cable and 
satellite networks.251 If the goal is to rationalize these disparities in both 
markets, there are two alternatives: (1) make the SBA more universally 
applicable (shield all pooled rights contracts by any sports league with 
any telecaster from antitrust inquiry), or (2) eliminate the SBA entirely. 
At the time of the SBA’s enactment, the four enumerated leagues 
were largely the only games in town. Although present, college sports 
had not developed to the level of ferocity of today’s college rivalries; that 
demand has been driven largely by the development of telecasts. In fact, 
the SBA noted this fact and placed extensive protections for college 
sports in the SBA itself.252 But today, that is not the case and the list of 
protected entities includes only a few of the choicest leagues in the nation. 
In the parlance of antitrust, could the SBA be considered as an 
institutionalized means for the protected leagues to “raising [their] rivals’ 
costs”253 and, therefore, indirectly decrease the ferocity of any competitive 
challenge? 
Before indulging in such theoretical intrigue, the relevant empirical 
question is whether the SBA currently creates disparities between 
protected and non-protected leagues and, correlatively, between 
broadcasters and non-broadcasters? A survey of federal trial court filings 
from 1995 to 2012 reveals few references to the exception.254 Likewise, 
judicial opinions that reference the SBA—traced back to the inception of 
the statute in 1961—are few in number and only once is the SBA 
dispositive to the case. A summary of SBA citations in judicial pleadings 
and the impact on the ultimate decision is set forth in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: SBA References 
 
 251. Cable and satellite do not fall within the statutory language of the Act. 
 252. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 253. See generally Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 267 (1983). 
 254. A Westlaw search of all trial filings to reference the SBA uncovered documents associated with 
only nine separate events. A PACER search of the same time frame has yet to reveal conflicting results. 
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Specifically, the original dataset reveals that the SBA was 
referenced only thirty times in the relevant time period.255 Out of those 
thirty references, the courts’ decisions most often found the SBA to be 
irrelevant (twenty-one times, or in 70% of the cases). The courts 
considered the SBA to be relevant but not dispositive eight times, or in 
about 27% of the cases.256 And in only one case (3% of the cases)—a case 
heard right after the SBA’s enactment—did the court clearly hold that the 
SBA was dispositive and, therefore, that antitrust did not apply.257 
In theory, the SBA makes the broadcast stations more attractive 
sports league partners than cable or satellite because of the minimal 
antitrust exposure associated with the pooling of rights. This is of 
particular importance to the NFL, which unlike the other leagues sells its 
media rights exclusively on a national level.258 In other words, the NFL 
always pools the rights of its member clubs and thus benefits the most 
from the express carve-out of such action set forth in the SBA. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the NFL receives the bulk of its revenues from 
transactions with broadcasters—CBS, FOX, NBC, and ESPN paid the 
NFL a combined total of nearly $25 billion for the right to air NFL games 
from 2006 to 2013.259 But not all leagues have stayed so firmly with 
broadcasters. There is today a strong migratory trend of major leagues, 
 
 255. See, e.g., Championsworld LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
Omitted from the dataset were references to the statute clearly made in error. 
 256. See, e.g., id. 
 257. Blaich v. NFL, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
 258. See Status of Competition, supra note 211, at 8776. 
 259. ESPN has been paying $1.1 billion per year, totaling $8.8 billion for 2006–13. Richard 
Sandomir, ESPN Extends Deal with N.F.L. for $15 Billion, N.Y. Times (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/sports/football/espn-extends-deal-with-nfl-for-15-billion.html. The 
contract was renewed for $15.2 billion for rights through 2021. Id. 
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such as the NBA and MLB, away from broadcast toward cable,260even 
though these contracts are outside the protection of the SBA, again 
indicating that the “protection” of the SBA is not taken seriously. 
The central reason is one of simple economics: sports programming 
is exceptionally expensive to produce.261 Broadcasters generally lose 
money on sports and purchase such programming to the extent that they 
need to develop their brand and promote non-sports programming.262 
Unlike broadcasters, cable and satellite operators earn revenues from 
both advertising and subscription fees; these operators are thus better 
positioned to turn a profit on sports networks.263 
The implication for the SBA is simple: because of its narrow 
limitation to “sponsored telecast” the explosion of alternative telecast 
formats (like cable and satellite) renders the SBA irrelevant. Moreover, 
there is ample evidence that the original policy goal of the SBA—to 
protect the revenues of incipient sports leagues—has been fully 
accomplished.264 To the extent that vestiges of concern remain for sports 
teams’ revenues, times have changed since enactment of the SBA; the 
expense of defending against any antitrust claim has diminished for all 
commercial actors in the face of increased pleading requirements set 
forth by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly265 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.266 
In short, the changes to the broadcast market, the sports 
entertainment market, and to antitrust law itself all support the 
conclusion that the SBA is already a functional nullity. Before the act is 
used for mischievous purposes,267 prudent legislators should certainly not 
expand it and would be well advised to repeal it. A repeal of the law 
would not change the antitrust environment for sports leagues; it would 
 
 260. See, e.g., John Ourand & John Lombardo, NBA Ready to Discuss Rights Deal, 
SportsBusiness Daily (May 13, 2013), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2013/05/13/ 
Media/NBA-TV-rights.aspx. 
 261. Another reason is that the MLB and NBA pool only a portion of their rights. The remaining 
rights are sold individually by member clubs where the SBA is simply inapplicable and unnecessary. 
The most vibrant market for these individual team sales are cable RSNs. See Flint, supra note 227; 
Time Warner Wins Dodgers TV Deal, ESPN (Jan. 22, 2013, 8:31 PM), http://espn.go.com/los-
angeles/mlb/story/_/id/8870267/los-angeles-dodgers-tv-broadcast-carried-time-warner-cable-starting-
2014-report. 
 262. Status of Competition, supra note 211, at 8777. 
 263. Id. What may surprise many is that on cable networks, sports networks (both national and 
regional) earn less profit for the operator than do other entertainment genres. Id. Because of the low 
profit margins involved, the combination of operators and leagues in RSNs, for example, appears 
much more likely to be for efficiency reasons and “branding” purposes than for anticompetitive 
rationales such as “foreclosure” and “raising rivals’ costs.” Id. 
 264. Id. at 8776. 
 265. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 
 266. 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). 
 267. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 300 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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merely dispose of the corpse of special interest legislation that no longer 
even serves those special interests. 
B. Time to Clear the Regulatory Playing Field 
This Article has touched upon several regulatory issues in 
connection with sports telecasts, but at least two are in the midst of 
reconsideration: the sports blackout rules and the cable programming 
access rules.268 In the first instance, the FCC is considering abolishing the 
blackout rules, and in the second, the FCC will consider instances to 
extend the access rules. As stated at the outset of this Article, the 
balance of antitrust and regulation is important to prevent the over 
deterrence of innovation. In that spirit, it is long past time to also abolish 
the sports blackout rules and to refrain from expanding the cable 
programming access rules. 
As previously stated, a blackout generally occurs when a specific 
media market will not broadcast a televised program at the request of the 
rights holder. Cable and satellite carriers are both subject to sports 
blackout rules.269 Basically, the blackout rules are implemented through 
byzantine regulatory mechanisms such as syndicated exclusivity and non-
duplication.270 Under the blackout rules, the FCC has upheld its strong 
interest in protecting and preserving the local broadcasters.271 But it does 
so arguably at the expense of sports fans in a highly developed sports 
telecast market. 
To the extent antitrust might thwart, or at least diminish, some 
league blackout rules, why should the regulator protect the league? To 
the extent the restraint is a necessary means for the league to regulate 
property rights, or even to the extent it is a justified means to ensure 
intra-league parity by revenue sharing schemes, then antitrust will 
uphold it. If it is not, it will not be upheld and the league will be forced to 
find other pro-competitive (and thereby pro-consumer) means to meet 
its internal goals. The sports broadcasting rules are thus an anachronism 
from industrial engineering schemes of the past. It is time to abolish 
them and move forward. 
 
 268. See discussion supra note 75. 
 269. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.111, 76.120, 76.127, 76.128 (2013). 
 270. Syndicated exclusivity rules were formulated by the FCC to shelter local television stations’ 
rights to syndicated programs by giving special and restricted rights for the programs to the particular 
station in the local market as opposed to allowing the programs to be carried on a superstation and 
distributed on a national basis. See discussion supra note 64. Additionally, network non-duplication 
rules were created to give a local television station the exclusive distribution rights for television 
programs and prevent duplicate programming carried on a national superstation. Id. 
 271. If the broadcaster, which maintains the other team’s rights, is televising the game, and if the 
television market is not included in the television home zone for the visiting team, then the game 
results in a blackout on the local MVPD. See discussion supra note 13. 
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The cable programming access rules likewise came from an attempt 
to engineer the industry to support a competitor to cable.272 Although 
perhaps warranted at their inception, it has been evident for some time 
that the original objective has been accomplished. As the FCC discussed 
at length, the satellite industry has matured and is fully capable of 
competing against cable without assistance from the FCC. Despite the 
general sunsetting of the access rules, the choice to continue regulation 
of RSNs should be watched carefully. Again, if unregulated property 
rights in RSNs did present a high risk that cable providers will abuse 
market power, antitrust would provide the backstop. Regulation of RSN 
access may, on the other hand, chill innovation in ways that we do not 
fully appreciate simply because the FCC has short-circuited such market 
experimentation. 
Conclusion 
Consider if DirecTV had exclusive rights to the Super Bowl—would 
antitrust and/or the regulator step in?273 Do we want them to?274 The first 
potential antitrust violator may be the NFL itself, which may have 
violated section 1 by centralizing the telecast rights to the Super Bowl. 
However, under the two-part American Needle test, the NFL is arguably 
engaged in its most “core activity” when it produces and sells the 
centralized, telecast rights for the Super Bowl.275 The Super Bowl 
represents the culmination of league play and the game derives much of 
its value from the season of competition among all teams. This single 
telecast, above all others, is arguably “league” (not individual team) 
property for the league to do with what it will. Therefore, the first inquiry 
of the American Needle test—whether the production of the Super Bowl is 
a “core activity” of the NFL joint venture—is answered yes. The NFL also 
 
 272. The cable industry’s very strength is itself largely attributable to regulatory interference that 
crippled land-line telephone industry in its potential rivalry with cable. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & 
Anil Caliskan, Natural Experiments in U.S. Broadband Regulation 9–10 (George Mason Univ. Law & 
Econ. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 08-04, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093393. 
 273. Several countries have adopted strict limits on the sale of sports broadcast. For example, in 
Italy there are strict controls on the sale of soccer telecasts. Martin Cave & Robert W. Crandall, Sports 
Rights and the Broadcast Industry, Econ. J., Feb. 2001, at F4, F17. Specifically, there is a prohibition on 
the collective selling of rights by the league and another regulation that prohibits a single broadcaster 
from controlling more than seventy percent of live matches. Id. In addition, each member of the 
European Union may “list” certain sporting events of national interest to give the rights’ holders 
additional protection against potential revenue siphoning by distant broadcasters; much like our sports 
blackout rules protects local broadcasters. Id. 
 274. See Michael McCann, Antitrust, Governance, and Postseason College Football, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 
517, 527–41, (2011). See Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2006) (explaining licensing 
rules); 47 C.F.R. § 76.56 (2013) (explaining “must carry” rules). 
 275. See supra Part II.B. 
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easily survives the second inquiry—the rebuttable presumption that a 
restraint is reasonable when highly correlated to the “core activity.” 
If the NFL’s pooling of the telecast rights is not problematic for the 
league, is the exclusive deal between the NFL and DirecTV of antitrust 
or regulatory concern for DirecTV? Does it provide excess market 
power to DirecTV?276 This is, of course, an empirical question rather than 
a theoretical one. That said, it is hard to imagine that a single show—not 
a network or even a programming series—would be dispositive of 
telecaster market power. The most inelastic demand for the Super Bowl 
is likely exhibited by sports bars (the core consumer). Other than that 
core group of consumers, whether sufficient numbers of consumers will 
switch to DirecTV such that it is profitable to maintain Super Bowl 
exclusivity (rather than license the show on a non-exclusive basis to other 
telecasters) is questionable. Because this is only a single show, it is easy 
for consumers who want to watch the Super Bowl not to buy DirecTV, 
but rather to simply substitute communal viewership for private 
viewing—for example, Comcast Cable consumers will go to sports bars 
or Super Bowl parties where DirecTV is available instead of switching 
providers themselves. Given the probable lack of market power that the 
Super Bowl rights would bestow, the exclusive deal is an unlikely 
antitrust violation. 
However, to the extent we as Americans simply cannot tolerate the 
thought of being excluded from viewing our “national treasure,” then 
regulators (and legislators) may be compelled to step in.277 Under the 
FCC’s broad mandate to promote the “public interest,” it is possible that 
the NFL might be forced to sell its product only to free over-the-air 
television; thereby ensuring revenues for Congress’ preferred technology, 
broadcast.278 Of course this implicitly transfers bargaining power to the 
broadcaster and limits, by fiat, the NFL’s right to maximize the price it 
demands for the product it has created. 
Taken to this extreme, the regulatory control of a single show seems 
a bit contrived and ultimately, unproductive. However, is it not this exact 
type of analysis that the FCC invites in the context of cable programming 
access rules? Even after the FCC determined that the market is strong 
enough to discipline the sale of cable networks, there are still FCC 
commissioners, scholars, and even Congressmen, apprehensive that the 
regulators’ ex post complaint system will be less effective than the former 
ex ante structural remedy.279 
 
 276. See supra Part III.B. 
 277. See supra Part III.B. 
 278. This is not dissimilar to the regulatory policies adopted by several European nations. See 
generally Cave & Crandall, supra note 273. 
 279. See supra Part III.B. 
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The policy suggestions made by this Article are aimed at 
rationalizing the regulation of sports telecast. At the heart of the FCC’s 
sports black out rules and cable access rules, the policy question is not 
necessarily whether we should “deregulate” sports telecasts. The better 
articulation of these recommendations is whether it is time to create 
regulatory symmetry. That is, does it make sense to maintain asymmetric 
regulation for one select segment of the industry (local broadcasters for 
example) under current market conditions? The answer is no. 
Indeed, the anxiety expressed by some in the face of regulatory sunset 
is largely misplaced. Now, more than ever, antitrust is better positioned to 
fill the gap left by the regulator in addressing anticompetitive conduct by 
joint ventures. As developed here, American Needle may be interpreted 
to stand as an adaptable two-part test that provides sound guidance to 
practitioners and the courts. The adoption of this Article’s policy 
recommendations will not ensure certain outcomes, but they will 
guarantee more level and equitable treatment of sports league joint 
ventures under both regulatory and antitrust regimes. 
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